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TITLE: INTERNAL SITUATION IN JORDAN.

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FILE No. **NE J 1/4**



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TRANSFERS:

Folio 295 — NES 1/10

LAST FILE: PART 'D'

NEXT FILE: PART 'F'

OTHER RELATED FILES:



281

CYPHER CAT A  
FLASH TEL AVIV


S E C R E T  
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

TELEGRAM NO 879

21 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T

DEDIP



ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONSEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 879  
OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1970 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH  
TO WASHINGTON CAIRO AND AMMAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 420.

WE HAVE HAD A VERY PRIVATE INDICATION TO THE EFFECT THAT  
THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD ISRAEL EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON OT THIS  
MESSAGE.

2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER SPEAKING  
SIMILARLY TO ISRAEL EMBASSY IN LONDON, WITHOUT REVEALING THAT  
WE KNOW WHAT THE AMERICANS HAVE DONE.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON

MR. BARNES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, AND  
CABINET OFFICE FOR SIR R. HOOPER AND MR. J. THOMSON/

F I L E S

COPY TO:

N.E.D.  
EMERGENCY STAFF  
P.S.  
P.U.S.  
P.S. TO MR. GODBER  
SIR P. ADAMS

DI4 M.O.D.

S E C R E T

NNNNN



282

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 418

TO TEL AVIV

18 SEP 1970. (MU)

CONFIDENTIAL. 181645Z

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELNO 418 OF 18 SEP. REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO AND BAGHDAD.

TODAY'S FINANCIAL TIMES QUOTES A SOURCE IN THE ISRAELI DEFENCE MINISTRY AS SAYING THAT AS LONG AS THE JORDANIAN ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN WERE FIGHTING AMONG THEMSELVES THE ISRAELIS HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERVENING. THE SOURCES ADDED QUOTE NOR SHALL WE INTERVENE IF IRAQ AND SYRIA BECAME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. BUT WE SHALL HAVE TO DO SO IF THE SITUATION IN JORDAN DIRECTLY THREATENS OUR SECURITY UNQUOTE.

2. THE ABOVE CONFLICTS WITH STANDARD ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT SIT IDLY BY UNQUOTE IF IRAQ WERE TO INTERVENE.

3. GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

A. & T.D.  
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N.E.D.  
NEWS D.  
DEF.D.  
EM.STAFF  
M.O.D.(INT.)

CONFIDENTIAL



NET 1/4 (283)

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 420

TO TEL AVIV

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

(N.E.D.)

D E D I P

S E C R E T 201120Z

ADDS TEL AVIV TELNO 420 OF 20/9 RPTD FOR INFMN IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
CAIRO AMMAN

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AMMAN UNNUMBERED DTG 201000Z.

THE KING TOLD ME AT 8-30 GMT THAT LARGE SYRIAN TANK FORCE WAS  
NEARING FRONTIER AND HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY HIS GUNS. WE (SIC)  
WOULD WELCOME ISRAELI OR OTHER AIR INTERVENTION OR THREAT  
THEREOF.

2. WE HAVE TOLD THE U.S. EMBASSY HERE OF THIS MESSAGE.
3. WE DO NOT (RPT NOT) INTEND TO TAKE ANY ACTION ON THE MESSAGE,  
WHICH YOU SHOULD TREAT AS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND SIR R. HOOPER  
AND MR. J. THOMSON, CABINET OFFICE/

F I L E S

N.E.D.  
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P.S. TO P.U.S.  
P.S. TO MR. GODBER  
SIR P. ADAMS

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S E C R E T

NNNNN

284

En Clair

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO AMMAN

Telno 359 20 September 1970

TOP COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

Your telegrams Nos. 1 and 2 received  
in letter pad.

Please telegraph urgently the exact terms of  
any appeal from the King.

DOUGLAS-HOME

[Copies sent to No.10 Downing St. Sir R.Hooper  
Cabinet Office and Mr. J.Thomson Cabinet Office]

FILES

N.E.D.

Emergency Staff

P.S.

P.S. to Mr. Godber

Sir P.Adams

COPIES TO:

DI4 MOD

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CYPHER/CAT A

S E C R E T

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO 360

TO AMMAN

20 SEPT 1970 (N.E.D.)

SECRET 202041Z

YOUR TELNO 4, LAST SENTENCE. DID THE KING ASK US TO PASS THIS REQUEST TO THE ISRAELIS OR WAS HE PASSING IT HIMSELF THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS?

2. YOUR TEL 202020Z. PLEASE CONFIRM REQUEST THAT THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE PASSED BY US TO U.S. AND ISRAEL EMBASSIES IN LONDON.

DOUGLAS-HOME

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, SIR R. HOOPER, CABINET OFFICE AND MR. J. THOMSON, CABINET OFFICE/

F I L E S

N.E.D.  
EMERGENCY STAFF  
P.S.  
P.S. TO MR. GODBER  
P.S. TO P.U.S.  
SIR P. ADAMS

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DI4 M.O.D.

DIO. ~~M.O.D.~~ *Cabinet office*

S E C R E T

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CYPHER/CAT A

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SH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO. 361

TO AMMAN  
20 SEPTEMBER 1970  
(NED)

CONFIDENTIAL 202215Z

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 361 OF 20 SEPTEMBER REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

JORDAN INTERNAL

U.S. EMBASSY HAVE ASKED WHETHER YOU COULD PASS THE FOLLOWING  
URGENT MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN.

BEGINS.

THE U.S. EMBASSY IN AMMAN HAS INFORMED THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT  
THE EMBASSY'S PORTABLE RADIO COMMUNICATION WITH THE PALACE IS  
BREAKING DOWN OWING TO THE BATTERIES RUNNING LOW. IT IS ALMOST  
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE EMBASSY TO COMMUNICATE SATISFACTORILY WITH  
THE PALACE.

THE SECURITY SITUATION AROUND THE EMBASSY ON JEBEL LUWEBDEH  
SEEMS TO BE CRITICAL. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE STATE DEPARTMENT  
UNDERSTAND THAT THE BEDOUIN GUARD ON THE EMBASSY IS DOWN FROM  
30 TO 15 MEN, TWO OF WHOM ARE BADLY WOUNDED, AND AN EXCHANGE OF  
FIRING IS GOING ON IN THE EMBASSY AREA.

THE U.S. EMBASSY ASK THE KING TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS  
IMMEDIATELY TO ENSURE SECURITY AROUND THE U.S. EMBASSY AND TO  
FACILITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SATISFACTORY COMMUNICATIONS  
BETWEEN THEIR EMBASSY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN. BOTH THESE  
STEPS ARE OF OVER-RIDING IMPORTANCE IF THE AMERICANS ARE TO  
MAINTAIN CLOSE COMMUNICATION AND IF THEY ARE TO BE IN A POSITION  
TO ASSIST THE JORDANIANS AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT. ENDS.

2. WE TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT WE WOULD ASK YOU TO PASS THIS  
MESSAGE AS SOON AS YOU COULD, BUT EXPLAINED THAT WE COULD NOT  
BE SURE WHEN YOU WOULD SUCCEED IN CONTACTING THE PALACE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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CABINET OFFICE]

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EMERGENCY STAFF

MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL



NET 1/4 (287)

S E C R E T

YPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1187

TO UKMIS NEW YORK  
21 SEPTEMBER 1970.

(N.E.D.)

D E D I P

SECRET.

210010Z

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1187 OF 21 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

FOLLOWING MESSAGE DTG 202020Z RECEIVED FROM H.M. AMBASSADOR  
AT AMMAN.

THE KING HAS TOLD US AS AT 1700Z HE WAS MEETING HIS CABINET TO  
DISCUSS THE SITUATION HE HAS DISPENSED HIS FORCES ROUND AMMAN  
IN A POSITION OF ALL ROUND DEFENCE JUST IN CASE IRAQ ALSO TRIED  
TO INTERVENE. THE CABINET IS TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO  
ASK FOR BRITISH AND AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION STOP

2. WE HAVE INFORMED THE U.S. EMBASSY HERE, AT THE KING'S REQUEST.
3. PLEASE SEE NOW MY I.F.T. ABOUT KING'S REQUEST THAT MESSAGE  
BE PASSED TO ISRAELIS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND CABINET OFFICE  
FOR SIR R. HOOPER AND MR. J. THOMSON/

F I L E S

N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF

P.S.

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

SIR P. ADAMS

COPIES TO:

D.I.4, M.O.D.

D.I.O., ~~HOOPER~~ Cabinet  
office.

S E C R E T



REPORT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SIR DENIS GREENHILL,  
DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND MR. JOE SISCO, HELD ON THURSDAY,  
SEPTEMBER 17, AT APPROX. 1.00 p.m.

---

After preliminaries:

Sir Denis - Listen, can we discuss for a few minutes the  
present situation in Amman?

Dr. Kissinger - Yes.

Sir Denis - What is your latest report actually from the  
City?

Dr. Kissinger - Our latest report is that the army has  
secured the Western Heights and is moving  
in on the road past the Intercontinental  
Hotel and your Embassy into the City and it  
has secured the Southern Heights. They have  
not yet entered, apparently, the very heart  
of the Palestinian section.

Sir Denis - And do you think that the King's claim that  
he will have the hostages tonight is a valid  
one?

Dr. Kissinger - We can't judge that. Our judgment is that  
the whole operation will probably take  
somewhat longer than a day.

Sir Denis - Yes, well that is important.

Dr. Kissinger - But our judgment is also that he can defeat  
the Fedayeen by himself.

Sir Denis - He can, yes.

Dr. Kissinger - That is our judgment.

/Sir Denis



Sir Denis Yes, I get it. Well now Henry, I don't know whether you have seen the text or what we have proposed the Berne Group should put out this afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger - I have not seen it. I have Joe Sisco on the line with me. We were just meeting.

Sir Denis - Yes, has Joe seen it?

Mr. Sisco - Good morning, Denis.

Sir Denis - Good morning, Joe.

Mr. Sisco - How are you?

Sir Denis - Not bad.

Mr. Sisco - No, I have not seen what you are talking about. I am au courant but I have to admit it I have read all the traffic but nothing in terms of this afternoon.

Sir Denis - Well now we have proposed that the Berne Group should put out the following communique - can I read it to you?

Mr. Sisco - Yes please.

Sir Denis - It says, "The five governments are ready to open negotiations about the proposal of the PFLP immediately the PFLP provide the Berne Group with their total demands, including specific lists of the Fedayeen whom the PFLP want. They have furnished the ICRC with an urgent mandate on this basis, meanwhile they must make it clear that they will hold the PFLP responsible for the safety of the hostages in Jordan." How does that sound to you?

/Mr. Sisco



Mr. Sisco

- Our reaction is that it sounds very good because it's really the precise position that we discussed with you and with the others in the case of a permanent solution. Obviously Henry and I will want to discuss it with the others and in particular we would want to evaluate the impact of such an announcement on the evolving situation on the ground, that is one of the obvious considerations. My own personal reaction is, certainly one quite sympathetic in an initial reading and then I think we can just let you know.

Sir Denis

- Yes. You are considering ...

Dr. Kissinger

- I share Joe's view.

Sir Denis

- Yes, fine. Well now the second thing is have you received the representations yet from the Germans?

Mr. Sisco

- We have not.

Sir Denis

- They are going to make some representations to you which they have already made to us.

Mr. Sisco

- To what effect.

Sir Denis

- Well, what it amounts to is this, that they think that if we cannot keep a five power basis could we proceed via a four power and/or a three power, or finally two collective agreement for unilateral action for each of us to do the best for our hostages.

Dr. Kissinger

- Denis, may I interrupt one second?

Sir Denis

- Yes.

/Dr. Kissinger



Dr. Kissinger - If you have no other business on the general situation we have left a meeting reviewing the whole situation, I hope I can return to that and let Joe talk to you about the hostage situation in which he is involved.

Sir Denis - That is very nice of you Henry. Thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger - Is that all right with you?

Sir Denis - Yes it is.

Mr. Sisco - I will join you in a moment, Henry.

Dr. Kissinger - Good.

Mr. Sisco - Denis, on this ...

Sir Denis - Can I just say we have Ministers at a meeting I am in No. 10 at the moment and, of course, we are, as we always have been, particularly concerned on public opinion concerning the hostages and ...

Mr. Sisco - Of course, but you see ...

Sir Denis - Can I first of all say, there are three possible courses if you abandon the five power approach, one is that the four of us say that the European prisoners could be exchanged for all hostages except the three Israelis, or whatever number the Israelis are?

Mr. Sisco - Well it is really three, but these three are also Americans.

Sir Denis - They are not pure Israelis?

/Mr. Sisco



Mr. Sisco

- No, no, they are Americans.

Sir Denis

- So it is three duals and so that deal would only be a feasible one for you if it was the European prisoners for all the hostages - period.

Mr. Sisco

- Yes. <sup>So</sup> See you cannot distinguish in that this deal is no deal for us.

Sir Denis

- Yes, but I mean if we could get all the Americans and the duals: are there no pure Israelis involved?

Mr. Sisco

- No.

Sir Denis

- You are certain of that.

Mr. Sisco

- Well, we are satisfied that these two or three have an American connection, they have American passports.

Sir Denis

- Yes, I see.

Mr. Sisco

- So that is the problem you see.

Sir Denis

- Yes, all right, well look there is theoretically a possible deal of all the European prisoners for all the hostages including the Americans and the duals.

Mr. Sisco

- How does that really differ from really the kind of an announcement that you are talking about?

Sir Denis

- Well, it ...

/Mr. Sisco



Mr. Sisco

- If this kind of a deal were available, we have really been trying to get this deal from the other side but the other side doesn't go simply because they are insisting on this exchange.

Sir Denis

- But its not really I think ... except that in their new situation they might agree to it. Well now, another deal would be, and I am talking in theory, that in view of the danger to our people that the Germans, the Swiss and ourselves swop our prisoners for our hostages leaving you unprovided for. The final stage is that we should agree amongst ourselves that nobody would mutually reproach the other if each person did the best they could for their own people.

Mr. Sisco

- Right, well Denis, obviously I can tell you we would have difficulty with all three of these approaches. And moreover I think your Government would want to weigh very very carefully the kind of outcry that would occur in this country against your taking this kind of an action as well as the Germans.

Sir Denis

- Yes.

Mr. Sisco

- It would be very strong indeed and be very sure your Ministers understand that.

Sir Denis

- Well they do Joe, but there is also an outcry in this country on the lines of because your visitor won't lift a bloody finger and put any contribution to a bargain our people get killed and you can imagine how bad that would ... and if it all comes out that we could have got our people out but for the obduracy /of you



of you and the other people so to speak,  
I am just talking ....

Mr. Sisco

- Although who knows what even a separate deal  
is feasible in present circumstances.

Sir Denis

- Yes, I mean people say why the bloody hell  
didn't you try.

Mr. Sisco

- Sure, sure; Denis, let's put it this way,  
as soon as I am out of this meeting we will  
give active consideration to the first  
proposal. You know, of course, that late  
last night ....

Sir Denis

- The first proposal being the communique.

Mr. Sisco

- Yes, but you should know that we have now  
gone through the Israeli's directly.  
Have your people been informed of this?

Sir Denis

- I think so, but saying what precisely?

Mr. Sisco

- Well to say to them basically that we want  
to act together and ...

Sir Denis

- Have you gone as far as to say that they must  
pitch in?

Mr. Sisco

- That is right, in other words, this is the  
first time we will have gone to them in a  
concrete and a unilateral way as it relates  
to a prospective Israeli contribution.

Sir Denis

- I see.

Mr. Sisco

- So I sent that out about 7.00 last night and  
I expect a report in the course of the  
morning on it.

/Sir Denis



Sir Denis

- Well, the Israelis are saying, of course ... what they are saying to us is that they cannot agree to anything because their whole apparatus is with you, so presumably you will ....

Mr. Sisco

- We will go now and let us see what we get on that. So I will report back to you and also give consideration to the communique idea.

Sir Denis

- Yes all right. You have the text of the communique so let me re-capitulate.

Mr. Sisco

- All right.

Sir Denis

- You will consider the text of the communique that I have given you. You will continue your discussions with the Israelis about making a contribution.

Mr. Sisco

- Yes, correct.

Sir Denis

- You will give us a view about the other proposals that I suggested to you ...

Mr. Sisco

- And the interim reaction is negative on this.

Sir Denis

- Yes. When I say proposals they are not proposals they are our reactions to this kind of thought.

Mr. Sisco

- That is right.

Sir Denis

- I am not proposing ....

Mr. Sisco

- No, let us not talk in terms of proposals because that is better ....

Sir Denis

- Line of thought.

/Mr. Sisco



Mr. Sisco

- Line of thought, let's use that.

Sir Denis

- Okay. Rightho Joe. Just let me ask ...

Mr. Sisco

- I have now become a regular member of the White House team.

Sir Denis

- Yes, so long as they provide you with a bed. Let me just ask the chaps here if they have got anything: Yes, the Berne meeting is at 2.30 this afternoon and that is whatever it is your time.

Mr. Sisco

- Okay, 2.30 and that is five hours ...

Sir Denis

- Its 3.15 with you now, its five hours, its ..

Mr. Sisco

- If we need an hour or two delay you will understand won't you, because you see the Secretary is scheduled to see Schumann this morning but if you should get a statement that we need two hours delay you will know its because we have got it under active consideration.

Sir Denis

- Okay, Joe. Thank you.



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Near Eastern Department

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M. H. ... (O.V.) 198  
M. H. ...  
M. E. ...

E. ...  
R. E.

JORDANIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The following comments on members of the new Jordanian Cabinet have been made to me by a retired Jordan Army Officer who is at present in London.

2/9.

Brigadier Hazen Ajluni - a bad man. Dishonest, an intriguer and former plotter against the King. He is said to have dropped some of his old friends who were bad hats and claims to be a reformed character. But not to be trusted.

Major-General Mutlaq Eid - a good officer and a reliable man. Armoured car expert who comes from the Petra area.

Brigadier Saleh Share'i. Was Military Attaché in London in the 1950s. He later was involved in plotting against the King and was sentenced first to death and later to 15 years imprisonment. His brother is still in exile in Kuwait, but the Brigadier was pardoned at some stage and returned to favour. He is said to be an efficient officer.

Brigadier Ibrahim Ayub. A Christian from Musn and formerly a Signals Officer.

Brigadier Fahd Jaradat - from Irbid. A former Intelligence Officer.

/Brigadier....



Brigadier Anwar Al Khalili - a Bedu of the Beni Khalil.

Colonel Dr. Yacub Abu Ghosh - a gambler and friend of  
Habes Majali which presumably explains his  
ministerial appointment.

Major Rifleh Awatallah - a strong man. From Madaba.

Formerly an ADC to King Hussein and later a Member  
of Parliament.

Major Ibrahim Sayegh - a Bedu of the Beni Hassan. A  
young and efficient officer.

Major Adnan Abu Audeh. An intelligent and efficient  
officer from the Howaitat.

2. My informant's comment was that the three Majors were  
likely to be the ginger group in the Cabinet.

PAV

(Philip Adams)  
18 September, 1970.





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*With the Compliments of*  
**MR. MOON**

1 Mr Tupper  
2 Mr Matthews  
3 Mr Longley  
4 Mr Gillmore

10 DOWNING STREET,  
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

5 Enter. R  
17/9



CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2077

TO WASHINGTON

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

NES 1/4  
(EMERGENCY UNIT)

CONFIDENTIAL

181216Z

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2077 OF 18 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO BEIRUT, BONN, BERNE,  
TELAVIV, CAIRO.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF TELEX CONVERSATION WITH H.N. AMBASSADOR  
AMMAN AT 1100Z TODAY.

## MILITARY SITUATION

2. ACCORDING TO THE PALACE WAHDAT (WAHDAT) CAMP NOW OCCUPIED  
EXCEPT FOR ONE OR TWO AREAS WHERE HOSTAGES ARE THOUGHT TO  
BE BY JORDANIAN ARMY. ARMY HAVE BEEN TOLD NOT TO SHELL THESE  
POCKETS. KING IS OPTIMISTIC HIS QUOTE SPECIAL FORCES UNQUOTE  
CAN GET HOSTAGES OUT. IN OTHER SECTORS THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN  
SIGNS OF ACTIVITY. PRECISE BALANCE OF POWER REMAINS UNCERTAIN.  
3. CONTACT WITH ICRC (BERNE TELNO 2 TO AMMAN) TELEPHONES STILL  
CUT OFF. ONLY MOVEMENT POSSIBLE IS BY ARMoured CAR. EMBASSY WILL  
DO BEST TO MAKE CONTACT AS SOON AS THIS IS FEASIBLE.

## AIRPORT.

4. THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED BUT NOW UNDER FULL ARMY CONTROL AND  
COULD BE OPENED WHEN NECESSARY.

## DOUGLAS-HOME

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EMERGENCY STAFF

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

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CYPHER CAT 'A'

FLASH TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 211430Z

TO MOD UK DIA

21 SEPTEMBER 1975

SECRET

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY NO. 10  
NEJ 1/4

ADDRESSED MOD UK DI 4 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO  
FLASH DA AMMAN, JIS HE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 211430Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY FOH 211030Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 211400Z SEPT.

ONE. IDF BELIEVE SYRIAN FORCES IN IRBID AREA ARE 67 AND 24 ARMoured BRIGADES: 12 AND 45 ARMoured REGIMENTS UNDER COMMAND OF 5 INFANTRY DIVISION WHOSE HQ IS CURRENTLY IN LIBNAN. PRESENT TANK STRENGTH IS ABOUT 300 WITH 80 ARTILLERY PIECES. 65 BRIGADE SUFFERED OVER 50% LOSSES (50 TANKS) IN EARLIER ENGAGEMENTS WITH JORDAN ARMY. INVADING FORCE IS REPORTED AS DIGGING IN USING BULLDOZERS WEST OF IRBID AND SOUTH OF LINE RANTA-IRBID.

TWO. JORDAN ARMY STRENGTH IN AREA IS NOT KNOWN BUT 40 ARMoured BRIGADE IS IN AREA. IDF HAVE NO CONFIRMATION THAT ANY OF THIS FORCE WAS DESTROYED ALTHOUGH 1 TANK WAS REPORTED KILLED. 40 TANKS ARE MOVING NORTH FROM AMMAN:

17 FROM ZERKA AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER FROM AQABA AND SAFI. IDF ESTIMATE THAT TOTAL JORDAN ARMY TANK STRENGTH IN AREA WILL BE ABOUT 220. THERE IS NO INFORMATION REGARDING A POSSIBLE JORDANIAN OFFENSIVE.

THREE. THE

SECRET



THREE. THE IRAQI FORCES HAVE MADE NO FURTHER MOVE WEST. IDF OPINION IS THAT EARLIER MOVE ALONG ROAD MAFRAQ-IRBID AND TOWARDS JERASH MAY HAVE BEEN COORDINATED WITH SYRIANS. THE JORDANIAN RADAR STATION WAS NOT CAPTURED AS REPORTED EARLIER. IRAQI TROOPS MERELY OVER-RAN THE AREA IN WHICH IT IS LOCATED.

FOUR. SITUATION IN AMMAN IS REPORTED AS BEING RELATIVELY QUIET. A BIG EFFORT WAS MADE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON BY THE JORDAN ARMY TO CLEAR REMAINS OF FEDAYEEN FROM ALDQ. APPARENTLY THIS WAS SUCCESSFUL. SALT, JARASH AND AJLUN ARE IN JORDAN ARMY HANDS. IRBID, RANTA AND MAFRAQ ARE UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A LOT OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THESE AND OTHER AREAS THERE IS LITTLE FIGHTING AND MOST OF THE COUNTRY IS QUIET.

F.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON AND DEFCOMCEN.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD DI 4 AND JIS HE.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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N.E.D.

S E C R E T

FFFFF



EN CLAIR  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TEL NO 633

TO F.C.O.  
21 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED 211500Z  
POOL COPY FOR FOLLOWING PAPERS:-

292  
X RECEIVED  
REGISTRY NO. 1

DAILY MIRROR, DAILY EXPRESS, DAILY MAIL, DAILY TELEGRAPH, THE SUN,  
DAILY SKETCH, LONDON EVENING NEWS, REUTERS, THE TIMES, BBC, ITN, NEJ 1/4  
LOS ANGELES TIMES, NEW YORK TIMES, A.P. AND U.P.I.

THE ARMY BRIEFLY LIFTED ITS ORDER TO SHOOT ON SIGHT YESTERDAY  
AND THE WOMEN OF AMMAN WENT INTO THE SMASHED STREETS DODGING  
SNIPER FIRE TO FIND FOOD FOR THEIR FAMILIES.

THEY CARRIED SHOPPING BASKETS PAST THE DEAD AND WOUNDED AS KING  
HUSSEIN'S ARMY RUTHLESSLY HUNTED GUERRILLAS WHO HAD IGNORED  
CEASE FIRE APPEALS.

SNIPERS HIDDEN IN MOSQUES AND ON THE ROOFS OF LUXURY APARTMENT  
HOUSES WERE BLASTED BY CANNON FIRE.

THE FIGHT FOR AMMAN, AND FOR A THRONE, IS IN ITS FINAL STAGES.  
BUT IT HAS COST MORE TIME AND MORE LIVES THAN THE TWO DAY BATTLE  
THE KING'S COMMANDERS FORECAST.

THE PAVEMENTS ARE LITTERED WITH CARTRIDGE CASES. BUILDINGS EVERY-  
WHERE HAVE THE BLACK HOLES OF ARTILLERY HITS. FIRES BURN ON THE  
HILLSIDES.

FROM THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL YOU COULD SEE A SALADIN ARMoured  
CAR SYSTEMATICALLY POUNDING A BLOCK OF FLATS FLOOR BY FLOOR AFTER  
A SNIPER HAD BEEN REPORTED THERE. THE SHELLS WENT IN ORANGE  
STREAKS LOW ACROSS THE VALLEY AND BURST THROUGH THE LIVING ROOMS.  
A SNIPER NEAR THE BRITISH EMBASSY KILLED A SOLDIER AND THE ARMY  
BLEW UP THE BUILDING IN WHICH HE WAS HIDING.

ONE SNIPER GOT A LUCKY SHOT THROUGH THE EMBASSY WHICH PUT THE  
TRANSMITTER TO LONDON OUT OF ACTION. THE STAFF HAD TO REVERT TO  
MORSE CODE UNTIL THE GENERATOR WAS REPAIRED. A SOLDIER  
STANDING NEAR JOURNALISTS WHO WENT TO THE EMBASSY DURING THE CURFEW  
LIFTING WAS WOUNDED BY A SNIPER BULLET.

/ THE RETURN



THE SHOTGUN FIRE WAS ERRATIC. A SOLDIER SHOT HIS JEEP MOUNTED  
THE HOTEL AND PUT A BULLET THROUGH THE HOTEL LOBBY  
WHICH SCATTERED NEWSMEN. PHOTOGRAPHERS HAVE BEEN TOLD THEY WILL  
BE SHOT IF THEY TAKE PICTURES. THE PROBLEM OF EVACUATING WESTERNERS  
FROM AMMAN IS STILL DIFFICULT. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY IS HOLDING THE  
MAIN AIRFIELD IT IS WITHIN MORTAR RANGE OF GUERRILLAS WHO ARE NOW  
FIGHTING DESPERATELY FOR THEIR LIVES.

THEIR RESISTANCE IS WEAKER BUT FIERCE AND ALL OVER THE CITY  
THEY COME IN QUIET MOMENTS FROM DUG OUTS AND RELEASE DEADLY FIRE  
AT ANYTHING THAT MOVES. THERE IS NO NEWS OF THE HIJACK HOSTAGES.  
CONFUSING REPORTS SAY THEY HAVE BEEN MOVED INTO NORTH JORDAN WHERE  
THE COMMANDOS ARE STRONG.

THE KING'S ELITE GUARD HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO MAKE A HOUSE TO HOUSE  
SEARCH FOR THEM.

ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE FIGHTING THE RED CROSS  
HEADQUARTERS WAS BLASTED INTO WRECKAGE AND UNTIL YESTERDAY WHEN  
THEY REACHED THE HOTEL FIVE RED CROSS PERSONNEL HAD BEEN CROUCHING  
IN THE STILL INTACT CELLARS WITH REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN  
FROM NEIGHBOURING HOUSES.

ENDS.....

MR PHILLIPS

[RELAYED TO REUTERS AND BBC]

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H.E.D.

££££

MEMORANDUM AMMAN TO FORNIA AND INTERNATIONAL OFFICE  
MEMO. 211530Z SEPTEMBER 1970

293

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UNCLASSIFIED.

211530Z

POOL REPORT FOR U.P.I. AND A.P. SEPT 21 AMMAN.  
FIGHTING EBBED TODAY IN AMMAN BUT ARMY UNITS SPORADICALLY  
USED ARTILLERY AND MACHINE GUN FIRE ON SUSPECTED 'MOUTONILLA'  
POCKETS' AND KEPT THE CITY IN A STATE OF TERROR.

ONLY THE REPORT OF ORDNANCE ARTILLERY FIRE ON HAMILTON  
INTERRUPTED A STILL, SUNNY MORNING. THE FIRE CAME AT VARIOUS TIMES  
FROM AROUND THE CITY AND SNIPER FIRE COULD STILL BE HEARD IN  
PARTS OF THE TOWN.

AMMAN AIRPORT WAS STILL CLOSED BUT AT LEAST ONE EGYPTIAN RED  
CRESCENT MERCY FLIGHT LANDED AT ANOTHER AIRSTRIP TO DROP OFF BADLY  
NEEDED MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR THE ESTIMATED 5,000 CASUALTIES IN THE  
CITY.

FROM THE INTERNATIONAL HOTEL THE OTHER END SIGHTS OF PERSONS  
SPARSELY SCATTERED THROUGH A HILL VALLEY. A BLAZE OF FIRE  
COULD BE HEARD FROM THE TOWN, AND RED CRESCENT ARMORED CARRIERS  
CRAWLED ALONG STREETS.

ON SUNDAY, ONE AMBULANCE CONVOY HAD TO TURN BACK ON THE SAME  
HILL TO THE CITY BECAUSE OF HEAVY MACHINE GUN FIRE. AND ONE AM-  
BULANCE ONLY HAD TO DROP A STRETCHER ON THE SIDEWALK AND RUN FOR  
COVER WHEN CAUGHT IN A CROSSFIRE.

THE ARMY LIFTED ITS GUNNERY ON THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE CITY FOR  
THREE HOURS SUNDAY AND JOURNALISTS STAYING AT THE HOTEL WERE ABLE  
TO WALK INTO THE STREETS FOR THE FIRST TIME.

THE STREETS WERE VIRTUALLY BOMED WITH SPENT AMMUNITION, MOSTLY  
TO CALIBRE MACHINE GUN BULLETS, AND THE SIDEWALKS DOTTED WITH THE  
PAPER CASINGS OF 100MM RECOILLESS PIPE BOUNDS.

DURING THE CEASEFIRE, ONE PALESTINIAN WOMAN CAME RUNNING FROM  
A HOUSE BURNING, CRYING FOR HELP. SHE FELL TO THE GROUND NEAR SOME

/BEDOUIN



DEADENED SOLDIERS AND BEGAN KISSING THEIR DUSTY FEET AND TUGGING AT THEIR TROUSER LEGS IN DESPERATE PLEADING FOR THEM TO STOP SHOOTING AT HER HOUSE.

THE WOMAN SAID SHE HAD THREE CHILDREN AND TWO ELDERLY PERSONS IN THE HOUSE AND HAD NO CHOICE, DURING THE TERRIFYING HYSTERICAL EXHIBITION A MORTAR ROUND FELL NEARBY AND TWO SOLDIERS HELPED HER IN TO THE LOBBY OF THE HOTEL WHERE A RED CROSS WORKER TOOK CHARGE.

DURING THE MORNING, FOLLOWING A LENGTHY LULL IN THE FIGHTING, SEVERAL CIVILIANS WERE SEEN WALKING CAUTIOUSLY ALONG STREETS ON THE NORTHERN HILLS, BUT A NEW OUTBURST OF MACHINEGUN FIRE QUICKLY DROVE THEM BACK INSIDE THEIR HOMES.

ONE DIPLOMATIC SOURCE REPORTED THAT GUERRILLA LEADER YASSIR ARAFAT HAD BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER'S OFFER FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE FIGHTING ON SATURDAY BUT WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE ORDERS FOR A CEASEFIRE TO HIS FORCE.

FCO PASS TO UPI AND AP PRESS

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHI. DISTRIBUTION:

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DDDDDD

FM CLAIR

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 211615Z

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

21 SEPTEMBER 1970

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POOL DISPATCH FROM:

DONALD R SHANOR CHICAGO DAILY NEWS.

RUSS BRALEY NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

ERIC PAGE, NEW YORK TIMES

WILLIAM TUOHY LOS ANGELES TIMES

ROLAND FLAMINI, TIME

ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE NEWS WEEK

NEJ 1/4

210910 AMMAN

JORDAN CLAIMED TODAY THAT ITS TROOPS HALTED AN INVADING SYRIAN ARMOR FORCE COMING TO AID THE PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS IN THE FIFTH DAY OF CIVIL WAR.

FIGHTING IN AMMAN WAS AT A MUCH SLOWER PACE THAN THAT OF THE FIRST FOUR DAYS. MOST OF THE EXCHANGES SEEMED TO BE SNIPER ATTACKS BY THE GUERRILLAS HOLED UP IN THE CITY'S BATTERED BUILDINGS FOLLOWED BY THE MASSIVE RESPONSE OF HEAVY MACHINEGUNS, MORTARS AND HOWITZERS FROM THE JORDANIAN ARMY SIDE.

CASUALTIES WERE HEAVY. THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY ESTIMATED FIVE THOUSAND DEAD OR WOUNDED AND JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICERS AND RED CROSS WORKERS WHO HAD BEEN THROUGH THE SHATTERED QUARTERS OF DOWNTOWN AMMAN AGREED WITH THE FIGURE. ONE WESTERN DIPLOMAT SAID THE RED CROSS MEDICAL TEAMS FLOWN IN YESTERDAY MUST RECKON WITH AT LEAST FIVE THOUSAND WOUNDED.

KING HUSSEIN APPEALED TO THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE OVER AMMAN RADIO TO HALT THE SYRIAN INVASION WHICH HE CALLED A HOSTILE PLOT TO PROVOKE ISRAELI INTERVENTION.

DIPLOMATS HERE SAID SYRIA SENT TWO ARMORED BRIGADES.. ABOUT EIGHT THOUSAND MEN..ACROSS THE LIGHTLY DEFENDED BORDER OVER THE WEEKEND. BUT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MARSHAL HABIS MAJALI SAID IN AMMAN RADIO BROADCAST THAT HIS TROOPS HALTED THE SYRIANS AFTER FIERCE BATTLES.

CORRESPONDENTS IN AMMAN WERE UNABLE TO GET TO THE SCENE OF THE FIGHTING IN NORTH JORDAN. THE SHOOT ON SIGHT CURFEW IMPOSED LAST WEEK WAS LIFTED FOR THREE HOURS YESTERDAY THEN PUT IN FORCE AGAIN.

/THE SYRIAN



THE SYRIAN INVASION THE NEWS OF WHICH WAS BROADCAST TO THE  
COMMUNITY BY EL FATEH RADIO. STAFFED AND ASSISTANCE OF

BUT IT SEEMED MORE LIKELY THAT THE SYRIANS WERE AIMING  
AT LINKING UP WITH THE GUERRILLA STRONGHOLDS IN THE NORTH OF  
JORDAN THAN TRYING TO DRIVE TO AMMAN.

HUSSEIN'S BROADCAST SAID THE SYRIANS WERE HEADING TOWARDS  
IRBID, THE NORTH JORDAN TOWN THAT WAS COMPLETELY IN EL FATEH  
CONTROL EVEN BEFORE THE FIGHTING BROKE LAST THURSDAY.

IF THE SYRIAN ARMOUR COULD LINK UP WITH THE COMMANDO-  
CONTROLLED AREAS, A SANCTUARY COULD BE CREATED FOR GUERRILLAS  
RETREATING FROM BATTERED AMMAN.

THE BRIEF BREAK IN THE CURFEW YESTERDAY GAVE CORRESPONDENTS  
THE CHANCE TO WITNESS THE WAR IN MINIATURE IN THE STREET AROUND  
THEIR HOTEL.

ONE NEWSMAN DUCKED INTO A ECOPIAY TO ESCAPE SNIPER FIRE  
AND FOUND AN ARAB WOMAN CRYING HYSTERICALLY BECAUSE SHE THOUGHT  
SHE HAD JUST SEEN HER CHILD KILLED IN THE CROSSFIRE. THEY  
CALLED IN JORDANIAN SOLDIERS TO INVESTIGATE AND FOUND IT WAS  
SOMEONE ELSE'S CHILD.

A GUERRILLA SNIPER FIRED ON A GROUP OF SOLDIERS AND NEWSMEN  
AROUND THE ARMoured VEHICLES IN FRONT OF THE HOTEL. ONE  
SOLDIER WAS CARRIED AWAY IN A RED CRESCENT .. MOSLEM EQUIVALENT  
OF RED CROSS.. JEEP, SCREAMING WITH PAIN, WHILE HIS UNIT  
POURED THOUSANDS OF MACHINEGUN ROUNDS INTO THE SNIPERS  
HIDEOUT.

A FEW HOURS LATER THE SAME INCIDENT WAS REPEATED THIS TIME  
WITH NO ONE GETTING HIT.

MR. PHILLIPS

[RELAYED TO REUTERS, B.B.C. AND U.P.I.]

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(295)

FLASH TEL AVIV

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DIA

TELEGRAM NO FOH 220838Z 22 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN  
TELETYPE No. 10

105 L...

SECRET

NET 1/4

ADDRESSED TO DIA DIA TELEGRAM NO FOH 220838Z OF 22 SEPTEMBER  
FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO DIA AND JCE WASHINGTON.

FOH 220838Z SEPT FROM BRITHILAT.

REF MY FOH 211438Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 220600Z SEPT.

ONE. IDF REPORT THERE WAS A FIERCE BATTLE BETWEEN  
JORDAN ARMY AND SYRIAN FORCES IN IRBID AREA PM 21 SEPT.  
SYRIAN CASUALTIES ARE SAID TO BE VERY HEAVY WITH A FURTHER LOSS  
OF SOME 50 TANKS. THE SYRIAN TANK STRENGTH IN IRBID AREA  
IS NOW REPORTED DOWN TO 180-200. THE IDF HOWEVER POINT OUT  
THAT THE SYRIAN TANKS WERE CONCENTRATED PARTICULARLY TOWARDS  
IN AREA NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF DERA. LOGISTIC COLUMNS  
CONTINUED THROUGH THE NIGHT FROM SYRIA THROUGH DERA, AMMAN  
AND IRBID.

TWO. JORDAN ARMY LOSSES AND PRESENT STRENGTH IN AREA ARE  
NOT KNOWN. IT IS REPORTED THAT THERE IS A VERY HIGH QUOTE.  
THE REPORT OF DEFECTIONS FROM 4th ARMOUR BRIGADE IS UNTRUE  
ACCORDING TO THE IDF. BETWEEN 1400-1500Z HOURS 3 X 4  
JORDANIAN HUNTER AIRCRAFT ATTACKED SYRIAN ARMOUR. TWO AIRCRAFT  
WERE HIT BY SYRIAN FIRE BUT ONE LANDING SAFELY AT HANAN AIRFIELD.  
THE FATE OF THE OTHER AIRCRAFT IS UNKNOWN.

/THREE.

SECRET



S E C R E T

- 2 -

THREE, WHICH ARE REPORTED THAT SYRIAN ARMOUR IS CONCENTRATING  
AND MOVING NE AND EAST OF INBID. ALSO THAT SOME ARMOUR IS  
MOVING SOUTH FROM AREA JUST EAST OF TOWN. NO CONFIRMATION OR  
OTHER DETAILS ARE YET AVAILABLE HERE. THIS MORNINGS PR REPORT  
IS STILL AWAITED. AMMAN IS REPORTED AS QUIET BUT TENSE WITH  
ARMY IN FULL CONTROL. THERE IS NO NEWS OF HOSTAGES.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DEFCONCEN AND WASHINGTON

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MOD DI4 AND JIS NE.

MR. BARNES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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S E C R E T

RECD IN CTRY MAIL 21 SEP 1970 NET 1/4
--

1. CHAIR

FLASH AMMAN TO FCO LONDON

TELEGRAM NO 616 21 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

I HAVE A NUMBER OF MESSAGES TO SEND PARTICULARLY ABOUT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BUT AM RESTRICTED TO ENCLAVE.

IF I CANNOT GET ASSISTANCE LATER FROM ETON'S RIVAL IN THE MATTER OF JUICE WILL HAVE A SHOT AT USING THE BOOK.

2. WETHER HAS WARMED UP AGAIN IN IMMEDIATE AREA PRESUMABLY CAUSED BY LEFT OVERS.

3. (PERSONAL FOR TRIPP) PLEASE FORGIVE LAST NIGHTS TESTINESS. WILL EXPLAIN LATER.

MR PHILLIPS

FILES

COMMS. DEPT.

M.I.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF

M.I.D.

NNNN

22

21/9

P.W.



CONFIDENTIAL

297

CYPHER CAT/A  
FROM AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 609

TO F.C.C. LONDON  
22 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

OF  
NET 1/4

CONFIDENTIAL 221200Z

BY AIR ATTACHE AND 1ST SEC. HAVE AGAIN SPOKEN TO THE KING BY  
P/T. THE JORDAN ARMY HAVE NOW CLEARED ALL RESISTANCE SOUTH  
AMMAN FOR A SHORT TIME THIS MORNING BUT WAS "MISSED" AND  
HAD TO BE RE-IMPOSED. THE ISSUE TO WHICH THE KING REFERS WAS  
APPARENTLY FEDAYEEN SNIPER FIRE PROVOKED BY BROADCASTS FROM  
DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD, WHICH SAID THAT HELP WAS ON ITS WAY.

2. THE KING WAS CONCERNED BECAUSE TWO DAYS HAD ELAPSED  
SINCE HE HAD ADDRESSED HIS APPEAL TO THE MAJOR POWERS AND  
EXPRESSED HIS HOPES THAT IF ALL THE ARABIC STATES OF THE GULF  
WOULD BE WELCOME, AND NOTHING HAD APPARENTLY HAPPENED. HE  
MADE THE POINT THAT IF ALL THE ARABIC STATES OF THE GULF  
THEY WOULD BE A PERMANENT INDUCEMENT TO THE IRAQIS TO ACT  
AGAINST THE REGIME AND TO THE FEDAYEEN IN AMMAN AND ELSEWHERE  
TO CONTINUE RESISTANCE. ONCE IRAQI AND/OR SYRIAN ARMOUR STARTED  
TO MOVE ON AMMAN IT WOULD, HE SAID, BE TOO LATE TO INTERVENE  
AND STOP THEM SHORT OF THE CAPITAL ITSELF, AND THE SECURITY SIT-  
UATION IN AMMAN WOULD BECOME EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

3. FCO REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

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H.E. DEPT.

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 636

TO FCO LONDON  
22 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 636 DATED 22/9/70 REPTD FOR INFO TO  
FCO LONDON.

YOUR TEL NO 365 OF 21 SEPTEMBER  
IT SEEMS THAT THE US EMBASSY HERE HAVE BEEN HAVING TROUBLE DUE  
TO LACK OF FUEL FOR THEIR EMERGENCY GENERATOR. THIS SEEMS TO  
HAVE AFFECTED COMMUNICATIONS BOTH WITH WASHINGTON AND THE  
PALACE. HOWEVER, THE KING HOPES TO BE ABLE TO LIFT THE CURFEW  
IN AMMAN FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF 22 SEPTEMBER AND REFUELLING THE  
US EMBASSY WILL BE A HIGH PRIORITY

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
EMERGENCY STAFF

... ..

A. & T. D.

AFR. DEPT.

ARAB DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT.

H. AFR. DEPT.

... ..

NEWS DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL



HER CAT/A

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FLASH TEL AVIV

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DIA

TELEGRAM NO FOH 221100Z

22 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

NES 1/4

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA TELEGRAM NO FOH 221100Z SEPT REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO JISNE AND BADHDAD.

FOH 221100Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

JORDAN.

ONE. THERE ARE REPORTS OF MOVES WESTWARDS OF IRAQI FORCES  
FROM MAFRAQ REPORTED IN MY FOH 211030Z SEPT (NOTAL).  
LAST NIGHT THE IRAQI FORCES ARE REPORTED BY THE IDF AS COMING  
UNDER JORDANIAN ARTILLERY FIRE. THE ISRAELIS ARE FRANKLY  
PUZZLED BY THESE MOVES AND HAVE SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF WE HAVE  
ANY INFORMATION ON THEIR SIGNIFICANCE IF ANY. THE IDF ALSO ASK  
IF WE HAVE ANYTHING ON IRAQI INTENTIONS.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DEFCONCEN.

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MOD DIA AND JISNE.

MR. BARNES

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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CYPHER/CAT'A'

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 426

TO TEL AVIV

21 SEPTEMBER 1970 (EMERGENCY  
STAFF)

CONFIDENTIAL. 212030Z

NY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1214/TO UKNIS NEW YORK: [AMMAN]

YOU MAY CALL TO PASS THE INFORMATION FROM 'THE PALACE REPORTED  
THAT A TOTAL' TO 'ALL CONCERNED' TO THE ISRAELIS.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

FCC/WHI.

EMERGENCY STAFF  
N.E.D.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CATIA

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 367

TO AMMAN  
21 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 211920Z

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 367 OF 21 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, BERNE, NICOSIA, HQSFNE, BEIRUT C.G. GENEVA, JEDDA, BAHRAIN, CBFC, WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, PARIS AND MOSCOW.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 339 AND TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE TRIPP/PHILLIPS 12.32Z TODAY. EVACUATION.

THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE SET UP TO CONSIDER EVACUATION FROM JORDAN MET THIS AFTERNOON. THE COMMITTEE DECIDED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF EVACUATION THROUGH AQABA SHOULD BE URGENTLY EXAMINED. IT REQUESTED THE FOLLOWING FURTHER INFORMATION BY 12.00Z TOMORROW :-

- (A) TRANSPORT AVAILABILITY, AQABA TO AQABA. WHAT ARRANGEMENTS IN YOUR VIEW WOULD BE NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF UP TO 300 WESTERN NATIONALS BY ROAD?
- (B) THERE ARE NO BRITISH VESSELS LEADER TO AQABA THAN TWO TANKERS AT ADEN (FOUR DAYS STEAMING TIME). THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTED YOUR SUGGESTION THAT A MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF MIGHT MAKE A RECONNAISSANCE OF THE SITUATION AT AQABA AND BE ASKED TO EXAMINE ALL OPTIONS THERE, IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SECOND STAGE OF THE EVACUEES' JOURNEY MIGHT BE BY NEUTRAL

/VESSELS

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VESSELS PLYING BETWEEN EILAT AND AQABA. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT PRESUPPOSES THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND OUT FROM THE ISRAELIS WHAT VESSELS WILL BE IN EILAT WITHIN THE NEXT THREE OR FOUR DAYS: AND SECONDLY, THAT WE COULD NEGOTIATE WITH THEM AND WITH JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES A SATISFACTORY UNDERTAKING NOT TO ATTACK THE FERRY WHILE ENGAGED IN THIS HUMANITARIAN TASK.

- (C) ALTERNATIVELY, CAN YOU ESTABLISH WHAT VESSELS OF NEUTRAL FLAG NOW AT AQABA OR LIKELY TO BE THERE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE, UNDER THE SAME UNDERTAKING FROM BOTH PARTIES, TO DO THE FERRYING?
- (D) THE COMMITTEE ASKED MOD REPRESENTATIVES TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING EVACUEES FROM EILAT OR SOME OTHER SUITABLE ISRAELI AIRPORT DIRECT TO AKROTIRI BY R.A.F. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT:
- (E) IF FLIGHT CLEARANCE EILAT/AKROTIRI PRESENTED DIFFICULTY, AN ALTERNATIVE EXIT ROUTE WOULD BE BY R.A.F. AIRCRAFT EILAT/MUHARRAQ, OR POSSIBLY EVEN AQABA/MUHARRAQ, IF THE AQABA AIRSTRIP IS SUITABLE FOR HERCULES AIRCRAFT OR EQUIVALENT. MOD WILL REPORT FURTHER ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS, E.G. REFUELLING:
- (F) TIME SCALE. THE COMMITTEE THOUGHT THAT EVACUATION OF AS MANY BRITISH AND FOREIGN NATIONALS AS YOU CAN COLLECT SHOULD START AT DAWN ON WEDNESDAY 23 SEPTEMBER, OR AS SOON THEREAFTER AS ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE:
- (G) COMMUNICATIONS. THE B.B.C. WOULD BE USED TO GIVE DETAILS SUCH AS RENDEZVOUS POINT OF CONVOY, TIME OF DEPARTURE, BAGGAGE

/AND

CONFIDENTIAL



FCO TELNO 367 TO AMMAN

- 3 -

AND CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS ETC. (BUT NO REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBLE USE OF A ROUTE THROUGH ISRAEL).

2. THE COMMITTEE ALSO DECIDED THAT IF THE SITUATION IN AMMAN IMPROVED, EVACUATION BY CIVILIAN CHARTER FROM AMMAN AIRPORT UNDER ADEQUATE LOCAL MILITARY SAFEGUARDS AND ICRC ARRANGEMENTS WOULD AGAIN BE FIRST CHOICE.

3. FOR TEL AVIV. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD GIVE THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IN CONFIDENCE A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF OUR THINKING OF EVACUATION THROUGH AQABA. YOU SHOULD ASK FOR THEIR CO-OPERATION IF THE PLAN OUTLINED ABOVE, OR SOME VARIANT OF IT, IS PUT INTO EFFECT AT SHORT NOTICE. IN PARTICULAR YOU SHOULD ASK THEM WHAT SHIPPING WILL BE AVAILABLE TO UNDERTAKE FERRYING BETWEEN EILAT AND AQABA, IF ACCEPTABLE ASSURANCES CAN BE OBTAINED FROM THE JORDANIANS. SECONDLY. WOULD THE ISRAELIS BE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO GIVE FLIGHT CLEARANCE TO R.A.F. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT OPERATING BETWEEN EILAT OR ANOTHER ISRAELI AIRFIELD AND AKROTIRI?

4. FOR JEDDA. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELY DELAY IN OBTAINING FLIGHT CLEARANCE FROM MUHARRAQ TO AQABA. WOULD CLEARANCE BE OUT OF THE QUESTION IF THE ROUTING WAS MUHARRAQ/EILAT?

5 FOR WASHINGTON AND PARIS. PLEASE GIVE THE AMERICANS AND FRENCH A GENERAL IDEA OF OUR THINKING, EMPHASISING THAT NO FIRM DECISIONS HAVE YET BEEN REACHED AND THAT ANY EVACUATION WE MIGHT ORGANISE WOULD INCLUDE AS MANY NON-BRITISH MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY AS WE COULD TAKE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FCO/WHI. DISTRIBUTION  
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302

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO. 1193

21 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET 211125Z

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1193 OF 21/9 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON , BERNE , MOSCOW , TEL AVIV , PARIS ,  
CAIRO , BEIRUT , NICOSIA.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING IS ESSENTIAL OF TELEX CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN AT 0900Z  
TODAY 21 SEPTEMBER.

2. BEGINS.

(AMMAN)

THE SITUATION THIS MORNING WHICH I HAVE REPORTED BRIEFLY EN-CLAIR;  
THERE IS STILL SOME FIRING GOING ON PARTICULARLY ON THE  
SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE TOWN AND ON THE FAR SIDE OF JEBEL EMEIDY.  
IT IS SO FAR MUCH QUIETER THAN IT HAS BEEN SINCE THE  
REAL BATTLE STARTED.

I ALSO REPORTED IN MY TELNO 632 THAT CURFEW HAD LIFTED AT THIS  
END OF JEBEL AMMAN FOR FEW HOURS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WHICH  
ENABLED ME TO LOCATE ALL STAFF AND ASCERTAIN THAT THEY ARE  
UNHARMED. WE WERE UP MOST OF THE NIGHT WITH TOINGS AND GOINGS  
OF ENVISSARIES FROM THE PALACE. I FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT  
MILITARY INTERVENTION ON THE LINES FORECAST BY THE PALACE  
YESTERDAY POSE VERY GRAVE DANGERS.

(LONDON)

HOW DO YOU RATE SITUATION AS REPORTED IN THE KING'S MESSAGES?  
IS THERE A REAL CHANCE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL PRESS ON IN THE FACE  
OF A TIRED AND DEMORALISED JORDAN ARMY?  
WILL THIS SWING MORE FEDAYEEN /FATHA AND POSSIBLY SOME ARMY  
AGAINST HIM?

(AMMAN)

I MYSELF RATHER DISCOUNT THE DANGER THAT THE SYRIANS WILL PRESS  
ON VERY FAR. THEY MUST BE LOOKING OVER THEIR RIGHT SHOULDERS  
ALREADY. WHAT THE KING OBVIOUSLY FEARS IS THAT HE IS GOING TO  
LOOSE IRBID AND OTHER NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AREAS WHICH WILL THEN  
BECOME A BASE FOR THE FEDAYEEN AND POSSIBLY FOR AN ALTERNATIVE  
GOVT TO THE KING'S . THIS WILL OF COURSE STIFFEN FEDAYEEN RESISTANCE  
AND PROLONG AND STIMULATE THEIR ACTIVITY IN AMMAN AS WELL AS  
ATTRACTING SOME FENCE SITTERS TO THEIR SIDE. /I THINK

SECRET



SECRET

I THINK ARMY MORALE IS BOUND TO BE ADVERSELY EFFECTED OUTSIDE THE CRACK UNITS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS IN THE ARMY. LATE LAST NIGHT THE KING WAS STRESSING THIS MATTER OF MORALE AGAIN AND AGAIN.

(LONDON)

EVEN IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES DO YOU CONSIDER THE KING'S REQUEST FOR ISRAELI INTERVENTION JUSTIFIED OR EVEN RATIONAL

(AMMAN)

FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW YES : I AM SURE HE FEELS THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD PREVENT ANY FURTHER ADVANCE BY THE SYRIANS AND EVEN CAUSE THEM TO WITHDRAW ON A PRETEXT OF ISREALI SECURITY RATHER THAN KING HUSSAIN'S.

A QUICK KNOCK OUT ON THIS BASIS OF THE SYRIANS WHO HAVE COME OVER THE BORDER WILL IN SURE CAUSE FEDAYEEN STILL RESISTING IN AMMAN TO GIVE UP WHEREAS CONTINUATION OF A SYRIAN PROTECTED FEDAYEEN HOLD OVER THE NORTHWEST COULD CAUSE THE AMMAN BATTLE TO GO ON INDEFINITELY OR UNTIL THE KING GIVES UP AND LEAVES THE COUNTRY.

(LONDON)

DO YOU RPT YOU REALLY THINK KING HUSSAIN WOULD HAVE A FUTURE IN JORDAN. LET ALONE THE ARAB WORLD. IF HE ONLY MANAGED TO RETAIN HIS AUTHORITY BECAUSE OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION IN HIS SUPPORT?

CAN WE NOW GO TO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION SO FAR THE JORDAN REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS ONLY QUOTE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE SEC GENERAL AND THE FOUR POWERS ABOUT THE

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/POSSIBLY

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POSSIBLY OF CALLING A COUNCIL MEETING. HE IS NOT AT ALL ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT CALLING A MEETING, YET UNLESS HE IS UNWITTINGLY ENTICED BY THE KEYS TO THE SO FORGOTTEN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IS LIKELY TO BE DELAYED. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT MAY ALSO BE INEFFECTIVE. BUT IT SEEMS TO US THAT IF THERE IS NO REAL OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF KING HUSSEIN (AND HE CANNOT COUNT ON THIS) THEN HIS AUTHORITY MAY HAVE EVAPORATED IN A FEW DAYS TIME AND A NEW REGIME OF FEDAYEEN WITH COVERT SYRIAN SUPPORT BE INSTALLED. THERE WOULD BE THEN NOTHING THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD DO TO HELP JORDAN. COMMENTS PLEASE.

(AMMAN)

ANSWER YOUR 1ST QUESTION. I AGREE HE MAY WELL HAVE NO FUTURE IN JORDAN IF ISRAELI INTERVENTION CANNOT BE DISGUISED AS PROTECTION OF ISRAELI INTERESTS PRIMARILY AND HUSSEIN'S INCIDENTALLY. BUT HIS MOOD OF LAST NIGHT THE KING SEEMED TO BE IN A REAL PANIC. HE FEELS THAT HIS GAMBLE IN LOOSING THE ARMY ON TO AMMAN IS GOING TO FAIL UNLESS HE BRINGS IT TO A QUICK CONCLUSION AND THE SYRIAN ACTION LOOKS LIKE PREVENTING THIS. THUS HE WILL EQUALLY HAVE NO FUTURE IF THE SYRIANS ARE NOT CLOBBERED. MY ONLY COMMENT YOUR SECOND PARA IS THAT I RATHER AGREE THOUGH I THINK THE TIME SCALE FOR THE EVAPORATION OF HIS AUTHORITY WILL BE LONGER. HAVING GOT SOME SLEEP EARLY THIS MORNING HE MAY WELL RECOVER HIS NERVE.

BUT SURELY WE ARE FACED WITH THE STARK ALTERNATIVES OF INTERVENING WHICH WOULD PROBABLY ENSURE THE SAFETY OF MOST FOREIGNERS BUT WOULD BE THE END OF HUSSEIN AS AN "ARAB" OR LEAVING HIM TO HIS FATE WHICH WILL MEAN THE FEDAYEEN REGIME WHICH YOU /MENTION.

SECRET



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MENTION. HOWEVER WOULD THE ISRAELIS IN ANY CASE STAND IDLY BY AND LET THIS HAPPEN.

(LONDON)

CAN YOU GIVE ME YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IRBID SITUATION ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS TODAY. IF THERE IS NO OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF THE KING. TO YOUR POINT ABOUT THE SAFETY OF FOREIGNERS, APART FROM THE SORT OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION AGAINST THE SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN ON JORDAN SOIL WOULD PROBABLY SIGN THE DEATH WARRANT OF THE HOSTAGES AND INCREASE THE DANGERS TO THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE UNLESS THE KING WAS ABLE TO RE-ESTABLISH IMMEDIATELY COMPLETE CONTROL IN AMMAN. GIVEN HIS CONCERN WITH PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS IN HIS ARMY I WONDER WHETHER THE SORT OF ACTION HE WANTS ISRAELIS AND THE WEST TO TAKE WOULD NOT DRIVE MORE PALESTINIANS AWAY FROM HIM.

(AMMAN)

I FEAR I CANNOT GIVE YOU ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE IRBID SITUATION OTHER THAN THAT DERIVED FROM THE KING WHO APART FROM OURSELVES IS OUR ONLY OUTSIDE CONTACT,

THE ONLY INTERVENTION OTHER THAN ISRAELI (THAT IS WHICH COULD BE REGARDED AS ACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF DANGER TO THE HOSTAGES LIVES AND TO THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY) WOULD BE A LIMITED ACTION CONFINED TO A TEMPORARY SEIZING OF AMMAN AIRPORT AND ITS APPROACHES ON THE WESTERN EDGE OF THE TOWN IN ORDER TO GET FOREIGNERS OUT. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PROCLAIMED IN ADVANCE THAT THIS WAS ITS SOLE PURPOSE. SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT OF COURSE SAVE HUSSAIN. THUS TO ME IT SEEMS THAT THE BEST OF A BAD SERIES OF ALTERNATIVES IS AN INTERVENTION BY THE ISRAELIS SOLELY

/CONFINED

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FCO TELNO. 1193 TO U.K.MIS NEW YORK

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CONFINED TO DRIVING THE SYRIANS AWAY AND PUBLICISED AS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST.

WE SHOULD HAVE TO MAKE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR BY EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS THAT ANY MILITARY ELEMENT IN THE INTERVENTION IS SOLELY TO ENSURE THE SAFE EVACUATION OF FOREIGNERS IN CONDITIONS OF BATTLE. PERHAPS IT COULD BE DESCRIBED AS IN PROTECTION OF AN ICRC OPERATION AND THAT THE MILITARY WOULD WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY THEY HAD ACHIEVED THEIR OBJECT.

(LONDON)

I CONCLUDE FROM YOUR LAST REMARKS THAT YOUR PRIME CONCERN NOW IS THE SAFE EVACUATION OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY. I AM SURE THIS IS RIGHT BUT MINISTERS WILL HAVE TO STUDY VERY CAREFULLY MODALITIES OF SUCH AN OPERATION. IT SEEMS INEVITABLY THAT THE FEDAYEEN AND PERHAPS MANY OF THE PALESTINIANS WILL CONCLUDE THAT THIS IS A MILITARY INTERVENTION.

HAVE YOU CONSULTED ANY OF YOUR COLLEAGUES ON EVACUATION UNDER MILITARY PROTECTION FROM OUTSIDE.

WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF THE FEDAYEEN NOT INTERFERING WITH SUCH A MILITARY PROTECTED EVACUATION ?

(AMMAN)

I HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO CONSULT ANY OF MY COLLEAGUES BUT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS SENT SOME OF HIS COMMUNITY TO AQABA. I MENTIONED TO THE KING THIS MORNING THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT WISH TO USE THIS ROUTE TO EXTRACT FROM AMMAN AS MANY OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY AS WE CAN REACH.

THIS WOULD BE THE GREAT MAJORITY SAY 130 OUT OF 137.

THE KING AGREED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA AND HE WOULD BE READY

/TO

SECRET



SECRET

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TO PROVIDE AN ESCORT BUT WE SHOULD NEED SHIP DIVERTED TO AQABA SINCE THE FACILITIES IN THE TOWN COULD NOT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES COPE WITH SUCH AN INFLUX FOR LONG AND WE SHOULD NEED THE CURFEW LIFTED FOR LONG ENOUGH TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS AND IN PARTICULAR TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE PEOPLE CONCERNED.

I REALISE THAT I HAVE COME OFF THE POINT OF A LIMITED INTERVENTION AND THAT I HAVE MENTIONED ONLY THE BRITISH COMMUNITY BUT I THOUGHT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS IDEA. WE COULD NO DOUBT GET OTHER FOREIGNERS IN ON THE CONVOY.

I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A 50/50 CHANCE OF THE FEDAYEEN NOT INTERFERING AND IN ANY CASE THEY HAVE TAKEN SUCH A CLOBBERING FROM THE ARMY IN AMMAN THAT ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE WITH SUCH AN EVACUATION WOULD IN MY VIEW BE INEFFECTIVE.

(LONDON)

AS REGARDS AQABA WOULD NOT AIRCRAFT (IF NECESSARY OVER-FLYING ISRAEL) BE BETTER ? HAVE YOU GOT ANY REPORT ON WHAT COULD BE TAKEN BY WAY OF AIRCRAFT AS OF TODAY?

(AMMAN)

AQABA AND AIRCRAFT. I MENTIONED THIS ON THE DJR/T TO MY A.A. THIS MORNING (HE IS WITH FIRST SEC. HE DOES NOT THINK THE AQABA STRIP COULD TAKE ANYTHING MUCH BIGGER THAN A DAKOTA BUT WE ARE LOOKING INTO THIS.

(LONDON)

HAVE YOU GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY QUOTE KEEPING /ITS

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ITS HEAD DOWN UNQUOTE UNTIL THINGS HAVE SORTED THEMSELVES OUT  
ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ?

(AMMAN)

I AM RATHER LOSING FAITH IN THE IDEA OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY  
KEEPING THEIR HEADS DOWN BECAUSE THE BATTLE HAS GONE ON  
LONGER AND WITH MORE INTENSITY THAN ANYONE EXPECTED. PREVIOUS  
ENCOUNTERS HAVE BEEN PUNCTUATED BY LULLS ENABLING PEOPLE TO  
GET OUT AND RE-STOCK BUT NOW THERE IS LITTLE LEFT FOR THEM TO  
RESTOCK WITH.

(LONDON)

HAS THE KING GOT ANY FURTHER IDEAS A) LOCATION AND B) STATUS  
OF THE HOSTAGES ?

(AMMAN)

NOTHING FURTHER ON HOSTAGES , I FEAR WE KEEP ON AT THE KING AND  
ZAID AND WASFI ABOUT THIS WHEN EVER WE RAISE THEM.

ENDS

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1199

21 SEPTEMBER 1970

(EMERGENCY UNIT)

CONFIDENTIAL 211500Z

ADDRESSED TO NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1199 OF 21 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, PARIS,  
CAIRO, BEIRUT, NICOSIA.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

THE FOLLOWING ARE ESSENTIALS OF THE LATEST TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE  
WITH AMMAN AT 1230Z ON 21 SEPTEMBER.

(AMMAN)

THE LATEST SITREP 1200Z IS AS FOLLOWS:-

IN HIS LAST R/T COMMUNICATION AT 1100Z ZAID RIFAI' REPORTED THAT  
THE SYRIANS HAD MADE NO FURTHER ADVANCE SOUTH OF ISRID AND WERE  
INDEED CLAIMING THAT THEY HAD NOT ATTACKED JORDANIAN FORCES AT ALL.  
THE KING HOWEVER WHO IS BROADCASTING AT THIS MOMENT IS STILL VERY  
NERVOUS (THOUGH SOME OF LAST NIGHTS HYSTERIA SEEMS TO HAVE  
EVAPORATED) THAT SHOULD THE SYRIANS AND/OR IRAQIS ADVANCE ON AMMAN  
THEY COULD REACH THE OUTSKIRTS IN A MATTER OF HOURS AND THE JORDAN  
ARMY WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT INDEED TO TACKLE BOTH AND KEEP  
CONTROL OF AMMAN AS WELL. I HAVE SO FAR NO CONFIRMATION OF THE  
REPORT CONTAINED IN TEL AVIV TEL TO 011000Z ABOUT THE IRAQIS  
ADVANCING WEST. THE KING HAS NOW ASKED FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT  
"IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES" I.E. SHOULD THE SYRIANS AND/OR IRAQIS  
ADVANCE FURTHER THE POWERS TO WHICH HE HAS APPEALED "SHOULD ACT".  
JORDANIAN ARMOUR IS NOT DEPLOYED AT THE OUTSKIRTS OF AMMAN TO  
MEET THE SYRIAN AND IRAQI THREAT. HOPPING UP CONTINUES IN THE TOWN.  
ONE OF MY STAFF IS AT THE MOMENT ENGAGED IN VISITING MEMBERS OF THE  
BRITISH COMMUNITY IN TRANSPORT PROVIDED BY THE ARMY PLUS AN AMBULANCE  
THE CURRENT HAS NOT YET BEEN LIFTED TODAY BUT HE HOPES TO GET  
ROUND MOST OF THE COMMUNITY THIS AFTERNOON. HE IS ADVISING THEM TO  
GET PACKED AND STAND BY IN CASE THEY HAVE TO LEAVE AT A MOMENT'S  
NOTICE EITHER BY ROAD TO AQABA OR BY AIR. WE ARE MAKING THE  
ASSUMPTION THAT A LARGE GROUP OF THE AMERICAN WOULD REMAIN IN THE EVENT  
OF AN EVACUATION. THAT IS PROVISIONALLY MYSELF COUNSELLOR DA1  
SEC 3 SEC AND 3 SEC ADMIN PLUS A FEW OTHERS. / (LONDON).

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(LONDON).

WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH AND WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN NEW YORK ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION IN JORDAN. THIS WOULD BE CONFINED TO A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. WE HAVE NO FIRM INFORMATION ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS.

NOW AS REGARDS EVACUATION A MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE IS URGENTLY CONSIDERING THIS. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES HOWEVER THE ONLY COURSE SEEMS TO BE FOR US TO LEAVE IT TO YOU, IN CONSULTATION (IF POSSIBLE) WITH OTHER MISSIONS IN AMMAN TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO SET ABOUT THE EVACUATION. WE DO NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF A MILITARY ASSISTED EVACUATION THROUGH AMMAN AIRPORT AND FEEL THAT A CIVILIAN OPERATION WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE JORDAN ARMY THROUGH AQABA OR, CONCEIVABLY, ACROSS THE ALLENBY BRIDGE WOULD BE FAR PREFERABLE. WE WILL OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO ARRANGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ANY ASSISTANCE THAT MAY BE NEEDED (F.G. A BOAT AT AQABA TO TAKE OF EVACUEES, POSSIBLY TO ELAT DISCREETLY, OR, IF THIS WAS WHAT YOU NEEDED, AIRCRAFT EITHER AT AMMAN AS IN JUNE OR AT AQABA). WE WILL THEREFORE AWAIT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS.

COULD YOU PLEASE KEEP US POSTED ABOUT THE SITUATION AT THE AIRPORT SO FAR AS YOU ARE ABLE TO.

ON WHOM IS THE KING RELYING FOR ADVICE AT PRESENT? ZAID RIF AI? MASFI TEL? HADITHA? OR THE MILITARY MEN? I HAVE SOME NUTS AND BOLTS QUESTIONS. PLEASE COMMENT ON OUR POINTS SO FAR.

(AMMAN)

THE KING IS RELYING FOR ADVICE ON ALL THE PEOPLE YOU MENTION EXCEPT HADITHA WHO HAS BEEN BITTERLY OPPOSED TO THE WHOLE OPERATION.

I AM DELIGHTED THAT YOU LIKE THE IDEA OF EVACUATION THROUGH AQABA. THE KING HAS ALREADY AGREED THAT IT IS A GOOD IDEA AND SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE AN ESCORT. IT WOULD IN A WAY BE A LITTLE INVIDIOUS BECAUSE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE FULK OF THE EVACUEES WOULD BE SOMETHING OVER A HUNDRED BRITISH, ABOUT 10 JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES AND SUCH OTHER FOREIGNERS AS WE CAN PICKLE UP FROM ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF AMMAN. SOME DESERVING

/ PEOPLE



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FCO TEL NO ..1199 TO U.K. MISSION NEW YORK

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PEOPLE WILL INEVITABLY BE LEFT BEHIND. IF THE SITUATION DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS IS NOWORSE THAN IT IS TODAY AND YOU COULD ARRANGE FOR A SHIP TO BE AT AQABA I THINK I COULD GET THE CONVOY MOVING IN 48 TO 72 HOURS. WE HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF AIRCRAFT AT AQABA BUT THE RUNWAY IS OF ANYHOW LIMITED CAPACITY AND MY AA IS NOT SURE OF ITS PRESENT CONDITION. I COULD PERHAPS SEND HIM DOWN TO RECCE BUT ON THE WHOLE THINK A SHIP IS THE SIMPLER ANSWER. AN EVACUATION OVER THE ALLENNBY BRIDGE WOULD NOT I THINK RECEIVE THE COOPERATION OF THE JORDANIAN ARMY WITHOUT WHICH IT CANNOT TAKE PLACE.

(LONDON)

THANK YOU VERY MUCH WE ARE FINDING OUT ABOUT DC3'S AND SHOULD USE ALL MEANS AT AQABA FOR EVACUATION SUBJECT TO YOUR ADVICE. PLEASE CONFIRM THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES YOU WOULD NOT SEE OBJECTION TO EVACUATION THROUGH ELAT AND ISRAEL.

VERY GLAD YOU HAVE MADE CONTACT WITH THE BRITISH COMMUNITY. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION WE WILL BROADCAST THIS ON THE BBC. IN THIS CONNECTION HAVE YOU ANY MESSAGES FOR US TO PASS TO THE COMMUNITY VIA THE BBC.

(AMMAN)

HAVE NO MESSAGE AT THE MOMENT SINCE WE HAVE MADE CONTACT WITH MOST BUT IT WOULD PROBABLY HELP ONCE FIRM PLANS FOR EVACUATION ARE IN TRAIN.

(LONDON)

ANY COMMENTS ON ELAT?

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/ (AMMAN).

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(AMMAN).

REGARDING FLAT I THINK THAT THIS IS POSSIBLE PROVIDED NOTHING WAS ALLOWED TO LEAK OUT IN ADVANCE ABOUT THE PASSENGERS DESTINATION. LATEST FROM ZAID RIFAI' TO MY FIRST SEC IS NO CHANGE. IRAQIS AND SYRIANS HAVE NOT MOVED BUT THE PALACE ARE PRESSING FOR AN INDICATION OF OUR LINE ON INTERVENTION. I HAVE SAID THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN BUT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IS MUCH MORE LIKELY THAN ANY KIND OF MILITARY INTERFERENCE. SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I SAID THIS TO MY FIRST SEC AND NOT RPT NOT TO THE PALACE.

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FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO. 1206

TO UKMIS NEWYORK  
21 SEPT 1973

(RM)

CONFIDENTIAL 211735Z

RECEIVED TO UKMIS NEWYORK TELEGRAM NO. 1206 OF 21 SEPT  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON BERNE MOSCOW TEL AVIV  
PARIS CAIRO BEIRUT NICOSIA

FOLLOWING IS AN EXTRACT FROM A TELEX CONFERENCE WITH HM  
AMBASSADOR AT 1630Z TODAY:-

2. BEGINS-

MIREIWD TEL ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY THIS EVENING AT 1540Z  
WITH A MESSAGE READING AS FOLLOWS:-

MESSAGE BEGINS:

MOST URGENT FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF  
FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED STATES.  
FURTHER TO MY MESSAGE TO YOU OF YESTERDAY I WISH TO INFORM YOU  
THAT THE SYRIAN ARMY HAS RECENTLY MOVED OUTSIDE AMMAN  
JORDAN THIS AFTERNOON. WITH FORCES HAVE OCCUPIED THE ENTIRE CITY  
OF IRBID AND TENS OF SURROUNDING VILLAGES THEY HAVE ARRESTED A  
LARGE NUMBER OF JORDANIAN OFFICIALS AND SENT THEM TO SYRIA.  
THE SITUATION IS BECOMING VERY CRITICAL I REQUEST YOU AS PERMANENT  
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DO ALL YOU CAN IN AN ATTEMPT  
TO MAKE THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HALT THIS INVASION AND WITHDRAW  
SYRIAN FORCES FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY.

MESSAGE ENDS.

TEL DID NOT SEEM ANYTHING LIKE AN URGENT AS HE WAS LAST NIGHT  
AND EVEN SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD DOUBTS THAT THE SYRIANS  
WOULD IN FACT TRY TO COME ON TO AMMAN. BUT HE REITERATED THAT  
IF THEY AND/OR THE IRAQIS CHOSE TO DO SO THEY COULD BE ON THE  
OUTSKIRTS IN A MATTER OF HOURS.

ENDS.

/3. A FURTHER.

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GYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO 1214

TO UKNIS NEW YORK  
21 SEPTEMBER 1973  
(EMERGENCY STAFF)

CONFIDENTIAL. 211245Z.

ADDRESSED TO UKNIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 1214 OF 21 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW TEL AVIV PARIS  
CAIRO NICOSIA AND BEIRUT.

FOLLOWING FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING ARE EDITORIALS OF THE LATEST TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE  
WITH AMMAN AT 1635Z ON 21 SEPTEMBER.

AMMAN.

RECEIVED TEL ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY THIS EVENING AT 1541Z WITH  
A MESSAGE READING AS FOLLOWS:-

BEST WISHES FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF  
FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.  
FURTHER TO MY MESSAGE TO YOU OF YESTERDAY I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT  
THE SYRIAN INVADING FORCES HAVE RESUMED THEIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST  
JORDAN THIS AFTERNOON. THEIR FORCES HAVE CAPTURED THE ENTIRE CITY  
OF IRBID AND TENS OF SURROUNDING VILLAGES. THEY HAVE ARRESTED A  
LARGE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND SENT THEM TO SYRIA. THE  
SITUATION IS BECOMING VERY CRITICAL. I REQUEST YOU AS PERMANENT  
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DO ALL YOU CAN IN ATTEMPT TO  
HAVE THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HALT THIS INVASION AND WITHDRAW SYRIAN  
FORCES FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY. MESSAGE ENDS.

TEL DID NOT SEEM ANYTHING LIKE AS WORRIED AS HE WAS LAST NIGHT  
AND EVEN SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD DOUBTS THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD  
IN FACT TRY TO COME ON TO AMMAN BUT HE REITERATED THAT IF THEY

/AND/OR

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AND/OR THE IRAQIS CHOSE TO DO SO THEY COULD BE ON THE OUTSKIRTS  
IN A MATTER OF HOURS.

ITEM 2

JACQUINET OF THE RED CROSS HAS REACHED THE HOTEL WITH FOUR OTHER  
RED CROSS PERSONNEL. WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHO THESE OTHERS ARE.

ITEM 3

I DISCUSSED FURTHER WITH MEREWID TEL THE IDEA OF EVACUATING  
THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY THROUGH AQABA. HE SAID THAT THE KING HAD  
INFORMED HIM OF THIS SUGGESTION OF MINE THIS MORNING AND THOUGHT  
THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT TRANSPORT AND SECURITY BEING  
LAID ON BY THE ARMED FORCES.

LONDON

REF. ITEM 1. MAY WE ASSUME THAT JORDANIANS DO NOT WISH US TO  
PASS THIS MESSAGE TO ANY OF THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

REF ITEM 3. GOOD. WE HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS ON THIS SUBJECT  
FROM HERE. WE TAKE IT THAT THERE IS NOTHING MORE THAT YOU WANT  
FROM US AT THE MOMENT.

AMMAN

REGARDING ITEM 1. ALTHOUGH THE NOTE I RECEIVED IS ALSO  
APPROVED BY THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WE CANNOT ASSUME THAT  
IF PASSED BY THE AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN IS THE ONLY WAY THE KING IS  
CONVEYING IT TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT IT WILL IN FACT REACH THESE  
OTHER AMBASSADORS. YETES LAST NIGHT WHEN TEL. IN AMMAN TO MAKE  
THE FRENCHMAN. I THINK IT WOULD THEREFORE BE SAFER IF H.M.G.  
DID CONVEY THIS MESSAGE TO THE OTHERS. IT MIGHT ALSO MAKE IT  
MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO PLAY AS THEY GENERALLY SEEM  
TO DO THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED ANYTHING.

WE HAVE JUST BEEN TALKING TO THE PALACE. IT SEEMS THE SYRIANS  
WILL IN FACT ADVANCE FURTHER THIS AFTERNOON. THE PALACE REPORT  
THAT A TOTAL SYRIAN ARMoured FORCE OF 200 TO 250 VEHICLES IS

/PRESENT

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PRESENT IN JORDAN. ONE COLUMN OF ARMoured VEHICLES (NUMBER AS YET UNSPECIFIED) HAS SET OFF DOWN THE ROAD SOUTH TOWARDS AMMAN. THIS WAS INTERCEPTED BY 4 BOMBERS THIS AFTERNOON AND THE JORDANIANS CLAIM TO HAVE DESTROYED 14 SYRIAN TANKS. 2 JORDANIAN AIRCRAFT WERE SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BUT SHOULD BE BACK IN SERVICE SOON.

THE GOVERNOR AND HEAD OF POLICE OF THE IRBID DISTRICT HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY THE SYRIANS AND TAKEN TO SYRIA.

THE PALACE WOULD LIKE THIS INFORMATION TO BE PASSED ON TO "ALL CONCERNED". THEY SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE THE ISRAELIS IN THIS PHRASE.

A CEASE FIRE HAS BEEN ORDERED IN AMMAN AND THE KING HOPES TO LIFT THE CURFEW FOR PART OF TOMORROW. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN OF COURSE WHETHER THE MORE FANATICAL ELEMENTS OF THE FEDAYEEN LIKEWISE OBSERVE THE CEASE FIRE.

THE PALACE ARE ANXIOUS TO KNOW THE SITUATION IN REGARD TO THE MEDICAL RELIEF OPERATION. THEY HAVE PROMISED US EARLY INFORMATION AS TO WHEN AMMAN AIRPORT CAN BE OPENED AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOME IDEA OF WHEN THE BRITISH RELIEF SUPPLIES AT LATEST CAN ARRIVE.

LONDON

BRITISH MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE BEING CONCENTRATED AT BEIRUT IN PREPARATION FOR AN OPERATION UNDER AN ICRC UMBRELLA TO TRANSPORT THE MEDICAL CONTINENT OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED TO AMMAN. FOR THIS PURPOSE THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVES JACQUINET, BOISSIER AND BOISARD ARE IN BEIRUT AND AS YOU HAVE REPORTED HAVE BEEN TO AMMAN. IT IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT ANYTHING MORE THAN THE STORES THEMSELVES WILL BE SENT TO AMMAN UNTIL THE ICRC HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE PROPER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL INVOLVED.

AMMAN

FOR THE RECORD JACQUINET IS NOT IN BEIRUT BUT HAS BEEN FLAT ON HIS FACE IN A CELLAR IN AMMAN FOR 4 DAYS UNTIL HE REACHED THE

/INTERCONTINENTAL

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WITH BODIES LYING ALL OVER THE STREETS THE ICRC CANNOT COORDINATE THE OPERATION A LITTLE FASTER. H.M.G. APPEAR TO HAVE DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE. I BELIEVE THE AIRPORT WHERE AT LEAST THE FIRST FIELD HOSPITAL WILL BE SITUATED WILL BE A SAFE AREA TO ORIGIN. I DO HOPE WE CAN SPEED THINGS UP A LITTLE BIT. WHAT ABOUT THE AMERICANS?

LONDON

THE AMERICANS I BELIEVE ALSO STYMIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE HOPING TO OPERATE UNDER AN ICRC UMBRELLA WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN ERECTED. WE ARE HOWEVER GETTING ON TO GENEVA NOW TO REPRESENT TO THEM THE VERY GREAT URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM.

GOING BACK TO THE KING'S MESSAGE, WE READ THIS AS REFERRING ALMOST ENTIRELY TO DIPLOMATIC ACTION, E.G. IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND BILATERALLY WITH THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. DO YOU READ IT THIS WAY TOO? YOU MAY LIKE TO KNOW THAT THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN ACTION IN DAMASCUS TO TRY TO RESTRAIN THE SYRIANS.

AMMAN

THIS LAST ITEM SHOULD GO SOME WAY TOWARDS CALMING THE KING.

AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF HIS MESSAGE HE IS QUITE CLEARLY HOPING FOR EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION. IF DIPLOMACY IS INEFFECTIVE THEN HE NO DOUBTS HOPES FOR MATERIAL INTERVENTION. IN THIS SITUATION HE IS HOPING FOR MIRACLES. TEL CONFIRMED TO ME THIS EVENING THAT THE ONLY WAY TO HALT THE SYRIANS (IF THEY ARE DETERMINED TO COME ON) WITHOUT RUINING HUSSEIN'S POSITION AS AN ARAB LEADER, IS AS I SAID THIS MORNING, FOR THE ISRAELIS TO DO SO ON THE PRETEXT OF THEIR OWN SECURITY. AS I POINTED OUT TO TEL ONLY THE AMERICANS COULD HOPE TO PRESSURISE THE ISRAELIS IN THIS MATTER.

/LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 1244 TO DOWNSIDE ROW

- 5 -

LONDON

AS REGARDS MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND SPARE PARTS FOR YOUR GENERATOR AND THE CBOS WE ARE SEEKING URGENT MINISTERIAL AUTHORITY TO HIRE A DC6 AIRCRAFT ON 23 SEPTEMBER BEIRUT/AMMAN/BEIRUT TO BRING THESE STORES TO AMMAN. THE AMOUNT OF MEDICAL STORES LOADED WILL OF COURSE DEPEND ON HOW MUCH WE CAN GET ACROSS FROM AKROTIRI FROM BEIRUT FOR THE DC6. WE WILL SEND DETAILS TOMORROW.

AMMAN

MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE INFORMATION ABOUT MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND SPARE PARTS FOR MY CBO.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION  
EMERGENCY STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1217

TO NEW YORK (C.R. MISS)

22 SEPTEMBER 1970

(EMERGENCY STAFF)

SECRET. 220233Z

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1215.

THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY HAS BEEN CONSULTED AND IN ALL THE  
CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERS THAT THE MESSAGE IS WELL WORTH THE SENDING  
DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

EMERGENCY STAFF

N.E.D.

P.S. TO P.U.S.

PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRET



CYPHER CAT 'A'

FLASH TEL AVIV

SECRET

TO MOD UK DI 4

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 221140Z SEPT 22 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET 221140Z

ADDRESSED MOD UK DI 4 REF JIS NE DA AMMAN AND WASHINGTON.

FOH 221140Z SEPT FROM BRITHMILAT.

REF MY FOH 220830Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 221100Z SEPT.

REF 221140Z  
NEJ 1/4

ONE IDF REPORT TANK BATTLE OF 21 SEPT WAS LARGELY A STATIC BATTLE IN WHICH THE JORDAN ARMY USED BOTH ARTILLERY AND AIR IN SUPPORT OF TANKS AS A RESULT OF WHICH HEAVY LOSSES WERE INFLICTED. PR INFORMATION OF THIS MORNING INDICATES THAT BATTLE IS CONTINUING ON ROUGHLY THE SAME LINES WITH THE SYRIANS ATTEMPTING TO MOVE SOUTH. RELATIVE TANK STRENGTH IS NOW REPORTED AS BEING ROUGHLY THE SAME IN COMBAT READY VEHICLES WITH SYRIANS HAVING 180 AND JORDAN ARMY 150.

TWO. LAST NIGHT IRAQI FORCES CONTINUED TO PROBE WESTWARDS ALONG BOTH MAFRAQ-IBID AND MAFRAQ-JERASH ROADS UNTIL THEY MADE CONTACT AND CAME UNDER JORDAN ARMY ARTILLERY FIRE. THIS PROBING BY IRAQI FORCES CONTINUED THIS MORNING.

THREE. IDF SAY AMMAN IS NOW REPORTED AS BEING FAR FROM QUIET. FIRING HAS CONTINUED FROM JEBEL HUSSEIN AND OTHER AREAS IN CITY WITH RESULT THAT CURFEW HAS BEEN REIMPOSED.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON AND DEFCONCEN.

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD UK DI 4 AND JIS NE.

MR. BARNES

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

NO/WHI/WHI DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

HER CAT/A  
FLASH AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 641

TO F.C.O. LONDON  
23 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL. 230505Z.

NEJ 1/4

ADDRESSED TO FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NO 641 DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1970  
REPEATED FLASH TO BEIRUT NICOSIA HQBFNE CG GENEVA WASHINGTON AND  
PARIS.

SITUATION AS OF 10V IN AMMAN MUCH QUIETER THAN YESTERDAY.

DEFCONCEN PASS FLASH TO HQBFNE

FCO PASS FLASH TO NICOSIA C C GENEVA WASHINGTON AND PARIS AND  
DEFCONCEN

MR PHILLIPS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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NNNNN



309

SECRET

U.S. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
NUMBER 1213

TO UKMIS NEW YORK  
22 SEPTEMBER 1977  
(HE)

SECRET.

220930Z

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK FOR COSFA TELETYPE NO. 1213 OF 22  
SEPTEMBER RE-ROUTED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV,  
BERNE, C G GENEVA, ANKARA, CAIRO, PARIS, MOSCOW.

JORDAN.

FOLLOWING ARE THE ESSENTIALS OF THE TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH  
AMMAN AT 0630Z THIS MORNING.

BEGINS.

(LONDON) IN ADDITION TO :

1. THE INTERNAL SITUATION  
MAY I ASK YOU FOR A QUICK RUN DOWN ALSO ON
2. THE HOSTAGES
3. THE STATE OF THE EMBASSYS COMMS

(AMMAN) THE CURFEW HAS BEEN LIFTED BETWEEN 0600 AND 1800 LOCAL TIME  
WITH THE EFFECT THAT AT THE JEBEL AMMAN END OF TOWN  
CIVILIANS CAN LEAVE THEIR HOUSES AND TRY TO FIND SUPPLIES  
WITHOUT BEING SHOT BY THE ARMY BUT FEDAYEEN SNIPERS ARE  
STILL INTERMITTENTLY ACTIVE AND HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO BE  
SO BY RADIO WHICH MENTIONS THAT HELP IS ON ITS WAY. WE HAVE  
NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE PALACE SO FAR  
THIS MORNING AND HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS OF THE SYRIAN OR  
IRAQI ADVANCE.

A CONTACT LATER LAST NIGHT REVEALED THAT THE KING APPRECIATES  
HMG ATTITUDE TOWARDS EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE FOR HIM AS

/CONVEYED

SECRET

CONVEYED THROUGH MY FIRST SEC. YESTERDAY. HE PARTICULARLY UNDERSTANDS OUR CONCERN FOR HIS LONG TERM POSITION AND HOW THIS WOULD INEVITABLY BE DAMAGED BY PRECIPITATE ACTION. HE AGREES WITH ME THAT HIS POSITION COULD BEST BE PRESERVED BY FORMAL INTERVENTION ON THE PRETEXT OF PRESERVING JEWEL INTERESTS.

I MAY SHORTLY HAVE MORE TO REPORT ABOUT THE KING'S ATTITUDE. WE HAVE NOW HEARD FURTHER FROM THE KING AT 0500Z - 24 IRAQI TANKS ARE MOVING WESTWARD ON THE JERASH ROAD STILL WITHIN IRAQI AREA. THE IRAQIS HAVE SINCE ASSURED THE KING THAT THIS MOVE IS MERELY TO SECURE THEIR OWN FLANK BUT THE JORDANIAN ARMY IS WATCHING CAREFULLY SINCE A CONTINUATION OF THE MOVE WOULD THREATEN THE WHOLE JORDANIAN POSITION IN THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE SYRIANS.

JORDANIAN MILITARY ARE MAKING AIRSTRIKES ON THE SYRIAN POSITIONS. JORDANIANS HAVE LOST 23 TANKS AND SOME CREWS. KING HUSSEIN IS SEEING THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT 1300Z. COULD THIS PLEASE BE PASSED TO THE AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS?

(LONDON) WE SHALL PASS THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE KING TO THE AMERICANS. I AM NOT SURE WHERE WE STAND AT THE MOMENT ABOUT PASSING INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS? BUT WE SHALL PROBABLY LEAVE IT TO THE AMERICANS TO DO THIS.

(AMMAN) YOUR LAST COMMENT THE KING HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THE ISRAELIS BE INFORMED SO PLEASE TELL THE AMERICANS THIS TOO.

(LONDON) I TAKE NOTE THAT THE KING HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT ISRAELIS BE INFORMED. WE SHALL TELL THE AMERICANS THIS TOO.

/(AMMAN)

SECRET



SECRET

FCO TELEGRAM NO.1218 TO UKHIS NEW YORK

-3-

(AMMAN) NO NEWS OF THE HOSTAGES.

(LONDON) 4. RE THE END OF CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT. IF THE DC6 IS ONLY CHARTERED TO TAKE MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND SPARE PARTS FOR YOUR GENERATOR TOGETHER WITH THE CBO FROM BEIRUT TO AMMAN ON WEDNESDAY 23 SEPTEMBER, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR SOME OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY TO BE AT AMMAN AIRPORT TO FILL THE AIRCRAFT FOR ITS RETURN FLIGHT TO BEIRUT AS PART OF THE EVACUATION EXERCISE? THIS WOULD NOT OF COURSE AFFECT ANY ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE TO EVACUATE THE BULK THROUGH AQABA (SEE RECORD OF MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE CONFERENCE ON 11 SEPTEMBER REACHING YOUR FIRST CONTACT TODAY)

(AMMAN) RE YOUR QUESTION 4. I AM SURE WE CAN ARRANGE THIS BUT MUST KNOW HOW MANY THE DC6 CAN TAKE ALLOWING FOR A MINIMUM OF LUGGAGE.

(LONDON) 5. THE GOVERNOR OF SEYCHELLES HAS SAID HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF SEYCHELLOISE DOMESTICS IN JORDAN. WE PROPOSE TO ASSURE HIM THAT ANY SEYCHELLOISE WHO WISH TO LEAVE WILL BE INCLUDED IN ANY EVACUATION PLAN. IS THIS ALL RIGHT?

(AMMAN) QUESTION 5. THERE ARE SOME 30 TO 40 SEYCHELLE GIRLS BUT IT IS UNLIKELY IN THE EXTREME THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXTRACT AND DISPATCH THEM IN THE FIRST FLIGHTS OF AN EVACUATION ALTHOUGH WE SHALL OF COURSE DO OUR BEST.

I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO COMMENT ON FCO TELNO 367

/AGREE

SECRET

SECRET

AGREE WITH PARA 2 IN ANY CASE IF WE WERE TO USE AQABA, THE TIME SCALE MENTIONED AT PARA 1(F) I.E. DAWN WEDNESDAY 23RD SEPTEMBER IS TOO FAST FOR US.

ANSWER TO PARA 1(A)

WE ARE ASSURED THAT THE JORDANIAN FORCES CAN PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TRANSPORT AND ESCORT. I AM RATHER DISTURBED TO SEE WASHINGTON TELNO 2783 REPORTING THAT THE AMERICANS WISH THE EVACUATION TO BE A JOINT OPERATION AND THAT U.S. AMBASSADOR, WITH WHOM I AM NOT YET IN TOUCH, DOES NOT CONSIDER THE TIME RIPE. WHETHER OR NOT EVACUATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL CIVILLIANS IS A MORTAL BLOW TO THE KINGS PRESTIGE, THE KING HIMSELF HAS GIVEN THE AQABA IDEA HIS BLESSING. AS YOU KNOW WE ARE NOT RPT NOT SUGGESTING EVACUATION OF THE EMBASSY AS A WHOLE.

IF THE MEDICAL AID OPERATION CAN BE PUT INTO EFFECT WITHIN TWO OR 3 DAYS THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD OF COURSE PROVIDE A SIMPLER AND QUICKER MEANS OF GETTING CIVILIANS OUT. THE AQABA IDEA HAS BEEN CONCEIVED AGAINST THE EVENTUALITY THAT AN ADVANCE BY SYRIANS AND/OR IRAQIS WOULD LEAD TO BATTLES IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF AMMAN THUS RENDERING THE AIRPORT UNUSABLE. I THINK WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPES DURING THE DAY BEFORE COMING TO A DECISION ABOUT THE PRECISE ROUTE AND METHOD OF EVACUATION. BUT IT IS OBVIOUSLY COMMON SENSE TO GET THE AQABA OPERATION AS READY AS POSSIBLE.

ENDS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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EMERGENCY STAFF

MOD INTERNAL

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SECRET



309④

EN CLAIR

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1224

TO WHIS NEW YORK  
22 SEPTEMBER 1970

(FN NEWS DEPT)

UNCLASSIFIED  
221435Z

*News 1/4*  
KING HUSSEIN, ROCKED BY THE EXTENT OF SYRIAN INVASIONS OF  
NORTHERN JORDAN, HAS APPEALED TO THE BIG FOUR POWERS TO COME  
TO HIS RESCUE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

2. NEWS OF HIS PLEA REACHED UN HEADQUARTERS AND CONSULATE  
OFFICES OF THE BIG FOUR - BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE  
AND RUSSIA - LAST NIGHT. DIPLOMATS OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES IMMEDIATELY  
WENT INTO A Huddle TO SEE WHAT RESPONSE COULD BE GIVEN THE  
JORDANIANS.

3. I ATTENDED A COCKTAIL PARTY GIVEN IN HONOUR OF BRITAIN'S  
FOREIGN SECRETARY SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME LAST NIGHT WHEN ALL  
CORRESPONDENTS WERE SUDDENLY CALLED INTO A PRIVATE DEN IN  
HIS SUITE TO BE NOTIFIED OF KING HUSSEIN'S APPEAL.

4. IT WAS QUICKLY MADE CLEAR THAT MEMBERS OF THE BIG FOUR WOULD  
GET TOGETHER TODAY TO DETERMINE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE.

5. ONE BRITISH OFFICIAL WAS ASKED BLUNTLY: WHAT CAN THE BIG  
FOUR DO, OR FOR THAT MATTER WHAT CAN THE UNITED NATIONS DO?  
HE ANSWERED: THAT IS A GOOD QUESTION AND FOR THE MOMENT WE DO  
NOT HAVE A GOOD ANSWER.

6. " I DON'T THINK ANY OF THE BIG FOUR FOR THE MOMENT CAN STEP  
INTO THE BREACH. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANYONE WILL INTERVENE IN  
JORDAN JUST NOW. WE ARE AWAITING DEVELOPMENTS".

.....7.

*PA*  
*26/1*

7. HE ADDED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BIG FOUR WERE ALREADY DISCUSSING WHAT STEPS, IF ANY, COULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER WORSENING OF THE ALREADY GRAVE CRISIS...
8. SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME IS GOING TO WASHINGTON ON WEDNESDAY TO SEE SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM ROGERS ABOUT THE CRISIS.
9. AT THE MOMENT IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT SIR ALEC HAS ANY DEFINITE PROPOSALS TO MAKE TO THE US GOVERNMENT BUT AS ONE BRITISH OFFICIAL ADMITTED: "THE SITUATION IS CHANGING SO QUICKLY THAT WE DON'T KNOW WHAT TO SUGGEST OR EXPECT FROM HOUR TO HOUR..."

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

NEWS DEPT

NEAR EASTERN DEPT

UNITED NATIONS DEPT

EMERGENCY STAFF



CYPRER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 895

23 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

DTG 231035Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 895 OF 23 SEPTEMBER  
R F I TO AMMAN.

AMMAN TEL NO 15 TO ME.

MILITARY ATTACHE IS REPORTING LATEST SITUATION REPORT  
FROM ISRAEL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SEPARATELY.

2. THIS SHOWS THAT AT LEAST SOME SYRIAN FORCES ARE  
BEING WITHDRAWN AND BEING REPLACED BY PLO/YPKK FORMATIONS  
OF THE P.L.A.


3. IDF HAVE ASKED IF WE CAN GIVE THEM ANY INDICATION  
OF KING HUSSEIN'S IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS IN THIS SITUATION.

4. GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING WHICH YOU OR AMMAN CAN GIVE US  
TO PASS ON URGENTLY TO THE ISRAELIS.

MR. BARNES

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NEJ 1/4


311

Vice Minister Vinogradov on 4 September, 1970.

The Ambassador began by expressing his regrets at the news of the death of Mr. Vinogradov, the Soviet Ambassador in Jordan, which had occurred during his absence on leave. He then went on to the question of Jordan, expressing HMG's serious concern at the situation in this country. If the worst came to the worst such a situation might lead to Jordan withdrawing her agreement to participate in the Middle East talks under Jarring, which would lead to the collapse of the negotiations as a whole. In particular, HMG was worried by reports that the Iraqi government had threatened military intervention in certain circumstances. We had heard these reports from the Jordanian Government and from Baghdad Radio. HMG was well aware of the difficulties: Iraq, for its part, had refused to accept the Security Council Resolution of November 1957 and committed itself to all-out support for the Fedayeen. HMG nevertheless hoped that the Soviet Government would be ready to use its influence with the Iraqis to restrain them from any dangerous and irresponsible behaviour.

2. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government also regarded the Jordan situation as troublesome, though at present it was difficult to identify the origins of these problems. The Soviet Government was particularly preoccupied because such a course of events did not create favourable conditions for the Jarring Mission. Such feuds were bad not only for the common Arab cause, but also for the task of the Four Powers, in their attempts to establish peace in the Middle East. Nevertheless, he had now heard that negotiations between the Jordanians and Iraqis were in progress and that the Arab League was meeting in Cairo. The Jordanian Government had not






approached the Soviet Union with any request for help: the Jordanians had merely informed the Soviet Government of what was happening. He had asked the U.S. Ambassador a day or two before what approach the Jordanians had made to them and Mr. Beam had confirmed that they too were merely being kept informed. The Arab League meeting was a positive factor and on the whole events in Jordan appeared to be calmer than a few days ago. For anyone to take action, there must first be a request: otherwise one might be accused of interference. The Soviet Government, after all, did not know the terms of the agreement between the Jordanians and the Iraqis dealing with the Iraqi military presence in Jordan.

3. The Ambassador said that he understood that at least the British, American and French Embassies in Amman had been approached by the Jordanian Government with a view to some possible quadripartite statement.

4. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government had received no such approach, and had merely been given details of the assassination attempt and of the Jordanian Government's rejection of the Iraqi ultimatum. The Soviet Government had not been approached in the subsequent two days. He repeated that there had been no request for either unilateral or multilateral action. The Soviet Government however shared the British Government's concern with the situation.

5. The Ambassador expressed the hope that none the less if a suitable opportunity were to arise, the Soviet Government might see its way to making these points to the Iraqis.

6. Mr. Vinogradov said that it was a fact of life that no-one liked to hear advice from another. It was necessary first of all that the Iraqis and Jordanians should clarify their positions. He did not believe that the Jordanian Government had yet raised the question of the Iraqi presence in Jordan with the Iraqi Government.



For the Jordanians, the first step was an approach to the Iraqis: there was no point in turning to outsiders first of all. The Soviet Government could not interpret the Jordanian approach as amounting to any kind of request for assistance; if the Soviet Government were to make an approach to the Iraqis, this might displease the Jordanians. The Soviet Government was watching the Jordanian situation closely.


7. The Ambassador said that his government had asked him to approach the Soviet Government, in the belief that the Soviet Ambassador in Amman had been approached in terms similar to those used by the Jordanian Government with our own Ambassador. The Jordanian Government had suggested a quadripartite statement, and he believed that there had been some discussion of this idea between Delegations in New York. The suggestion with which he had come today was somewhat different, being made on HMG's initiative.

8. Mr. Vinogradov understood that some kind of statement was under discussion at New York. The Soviet representative in New York was merely being told what he himself had told the French Ambassador on 3 September, namely that the Soviet Government were watching the situation, that they had not received a request of any kind, and that they hoped that the situation would calm down. Would H.M. Ambassador like to expound on his idea that events in Jordan might lead to Jordan's withdrawal from the Jarring talks?

9. The Ambassador explained that HMG were afraid lest, if the situation were to get completely out of hand, there might be a change of government in Jordan, leading perhaps to significant changes in policy.

10. Mr. Vinogradov admitted that they had not seen the situation in quite the same way. He then turned to the state of play in New York, drawing particular attention to the continued absence of Ambassador Tekoah.





11. The Ambassador said that he had heard on the radio that Akeah might be returning on Sunday, 6 September.

12. Mr. Vinogradov and his assistant both asked for confirmation of this fact. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government was very worried by the Israeli reluctance to get on with the talks. He had told Mr. Bean that if the U.S. wanted their initiative to succeed they would have to put pressure on Israel.


13. The Ambassador thought that Israeli actions were in part dictated by their grave suspicions regarding infringements of the ceasefire. He was sure however that the U.S. Administration was putting very significant pressure on the Israeli Government.

14. Mr. Vinogradov said that it was vital that the negotiations be resumed. The Arabs were very impatient people: President Nasser's acceptance of the U.S. initiative had led to strong criticism. He expressed regret that there should be those among the Arabs who played into the hands of those elements which opposed progress towards peace.

15. The Ambassador said that it was unfortunate that there had been moves on the West Bank of the Suez Canal, infringing the ceasefire agreement.

16. Mr. Vinogradov said that such reports might be true and yet again they might not. They had not themselves heard any such reports. And what about the UAR's complaints about Israeli activities on the east side of the Canal? The Israelis and Americans were ignoring these. However negotiations were the main thing: if they could get properly under way then such problems might be dealt with. He was afraid that the Israelis, aware of the U.S. Administration's interest in the success of their initiative, might be able to blackmail the Americans.

17. The Ambassador said that he was equally anxious to see the start of the talks.



18. Mr. Vinogradov understood that there was a possibility that Mr. Posen might return with useless instructions, confined to talking about prisoners of war and ceasefire infringements. Part of the trouble lay in the fact that the Rogers' plan had too many weak points. It was good however that the Arabs had taken it up. The Israelis on the other hand did not seem to be so interested in it.

19. The Ambassador hoped that Mr. Vinogradov was being too gloomy. He drew attention to the Israeli statement on the question of withdrawal, which was at least more forthcoming than anything they had said before.

20. Mr. Vinogradov thought all such statements were relative: it might be a move in the right direction. He then drew the Ambassador's attention to Mr. Brezhnev's statement at Alma Ata, which provided a clear, unambiguous picture of the Soviet position. The Soviet Government would like to cooperate with the British Government to secure progress in the right direction.

21. The Ambassador shared Mr. Vinogradov's hope that there would be such cooperation, and, on that note, wondered whether he might trouble Mr. Vinogradov with a message for Mr. Kozyrev. He had seen Mr. Kozyrev that morning, but the message had arrived since. The Ambassador handed over the text of the announcement of the Prime Minister's plans for visiting New York, explaining that he had been asked to pass these to the Soviet Government as a matter of courtesy, before their release on 5 September.

22. Mr. Vinogradov agreed to pass on this text to those he felt interested.



RECEIVED IN  
 REGISTRY NO. 101 CONFIDENTIAL

NEJ 1/4

NEJ 1/4

219.

Mr. Egeron  
 Mr. Hinchcliffe  
 Mr. Makins  
 Enter.  
 R.E. 2/19.

The Jordan Ambassador called this morning, on instructions, to inform us of the very serious situation in Jordan (on which he was in fact very ill-informed) and to ask for diplomatic support. He confirmed that the Jordanian representative at the United Nations had asked for a meeting of the Security Council and I said that we thought this the right thing to do and that our Mission would be in touch with the Jordanians and others in the hope of getting quick action. Mr. Sa'ad Juma was inclined to discount the possibility that other Arab representatives might take the opportunity to make trouble for Jordan saying that <sup>he</sup> ~~they~~ hoped the issue would be confined to ~~the~~ one of aggression by the forces of one <sup>state</sup> ~~side~~ upon the territory of another. He did, however, admit that King Hussein would, by his action against the fedayeen, have lost the sympathy of many people in the Arab world and that this would no doubt be reflected at the U.N. as elsewhere.

2. I informed the Ambassador that the Permanent Under-Secretary had spoken to the Soviet Ambassador and that we were also in close touch with the French.

3. Asked whether I knew what the Americans intended to do, I said that apart from humanitarian action I did not. To the question whether it was likely that we should think in terms of offering military support with or without the Americans, I said that I understood there was at present no question of our doing this.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4....

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I told the Ambassador of the various things which we were doing on the humanitarian front, for which he expressed profound thanks. He said he had heard from Jordan this morning that there was an urgent need for the blankets and food stuffs. I suggested that the right thing was to channel all requests for relief through the ICRC who would know which country was best able to provide what was needed.

PGM

(Philip Adams)  
21 September, 1970.


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Mr. Renwick  
Emergency Unit

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reference Moscow tel. no. 1022  
of 4 September



(2/87)

*Mr. V. Emergen as a  
skilful debater.*

*With the compliments of*

CHANCERY  
(N. H. Livingston)

*R.E.  
'9/7.*

7 September, 1970

Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O., London' S.W.1.

BRITISH EMBASSY  
MOSCOW

*Smyth & clay  
Com 4/ix*

*Mr. Lagg 9/9*  
*Mr. Jenkins*  
*Mr. Gans*  
*E.E.D. m*  
*13/9/9*

Mr. Tripp

18.9.

NET 1/4

Mr. Melhuish telephoned from Washington at 10.30 p.m. He said that the Ambassador had asked to be kept up-to-date with developments in Amman; he was not certain he had received all reports. I said that for obvious reasons there had not been a great deal of telegram traffic out of Amman today. However, we had just finished a Telex conversation and I undertook to send a summary by flash telegram to Washington (see FCO Tel. No. 2072 to Washington).

2. Mr. Melhuish also said that the Ambassador had asked about Berne Tel. No. 288 which reports that the Fedayeen have arrested some Swiss journalists in the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman. I said that we had only just received this report but that we intended to ask Amman for comments when we next spoke to them on the Telex machine, probably later this evening. I said that we were of course fully aware of the Embassy in Washington's need to be kept up-to-date, and undertook to pass on Mr. Melhuish's request for information.

*Vernice Beckett*

(V. Beckett)(Miss)

Emergency Unit

17 September, 1970

c.c. Mr. Egerton

Mr. Hanbury-Tenison



RECEIVED IN  
TELETYPE UNITMr. Tripp

NET 1/4

Peter Moon telephoned after seeing the beginning of the B.B.C. news at 21.00. He pointed out that the main feature of their report was once again an interview with an El Fatah spokesman, and asked if something could be done about it.

2. Mr. Reddaway was informed at 21.40 and promised to contact the acting Head of the B.B.C. immediately. He rang us back to say that the acting Head of the B.B.C. had promised to do what he could about our request. We informed Mr. Moon of this.

3. Mr. Reddaway telephoned again about 23.00 to say that, after seeing 24 hours, which had again broadcast pro-Palestinian views, the acting Head of the B.B.C. had told those responsible for these programmes that he was most dissatisfied. He hoped that there would now be some improvement.

*for* *La Laine*  
(C. D. Budgen)  
Emergency Unit  
18 September, 1970

*c.c. Emergency Unit.*

*Q 19/ix*

NES 1/4

Private Secretary *189.*

I submit a transcript of F.C.O. telex conference  
with Amman at 09.00 Z today, 18 September.

*D. H. Gillmore*

(D.H. Gillmore)  
18 September, 1970.

Copies to:

- Mr. Renwick
- Mr. Daunt
- Mr. Bottomley
- Sir P. Adams
- Mr. Tripp
- Mr. Hanbury-Tenison
- P.S. No.10

X P



✓  
NET 1/4

Private Secretary

... I submit a copy of a transcript of the telex conference between H.M. Ambassador in Amman and the duty officer in the Emergency Unit at 07.30 hours B.S.T.

(A. Ibbott)  
18 September, 1970

Copies to:

Mr. Welborn

F.U.S.

Sir P. ~~Mr.~~ Adams

Mr. Gallagher

Mr. Hanbury-Tenison

Mr. Tripp

P.S. No. 10

(317)

Mr. Tripp

20/9 X.

R. G. Green

NET 1/4

An official of the U.S. Embassy called the Minister, Mr. Green.


2. He said that the U.S. authorities had received information from Zaid Rifai at 07.45 local time that 50 Syrian tanks had invaded Jordan during the night in the Ramtha area. The Jordanian Army had intercepted the Syrian forces, destroyed several tanks and taken some prisoners. The remaining Syrian tanks had fled.

3. Zaid Rifai had told the Americans that the Jordanian Government was requesting the following:

- (a) that the United States issue a statement condemning the invasion; and
- (b) that the United States make a declaration stating that the intrusion of an outside power into Jordan could not be tolerated and would necessitate international action.

Zaid Rifai said that the same information had been passed to ourselves and the French.

4. The U.S. Embassy asked that either Sir P. Adams or Mr. Tripp call Mr. Green as soon as possible (U.S. Embassy Ext. 229).



(D.H. Gillmore)  
20 September 1970

Copies to:

Private Secretary,  
Mr. Daunt,  
Sir P. Adams,  
Emergency Unit,  
P.S. No.10.

S E C R E T

CYPHER CAT/A  
FLASH AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 626

TO F.C.O. LONDON  
20 SEPTEMBER 1970

NET 1/4

SECRET. 202150Z

YOUR TEL NO 360. ZEID RIFA'I MADE THE REQUEST BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE KING'S BEHALF. HE ASKED US REPEAT US TO PASS THIS REQUEST TO THE ISRAELIS.

2. CONFIRMED

MR. PHILLIPS

/COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, SIR R. HOOPER  
AND MR. J. THOMSON, CABINET OFFICE/

F I L E S

N.E.D.  
EMERGENCY STAFF  
PRIVATE SECRETARY  
P.S. TO MR. GODBER  
SIR P. ADAMS

COPIES TO:

D 14, M.O.D.  
DIO, CABINET OFFICE

S E C R E T

NNNNN



CLAIR  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEPHONE 10 4341

TOP  
TO F C O LONDON  
21 SEPTEMBER 1978

NET 1/4  
S/N 10

PN4/1/10

UNCLASSIFIED. 211510Z

FOLLOWING FOR ROBIN DAY, PANORAMA, FOR BROADCAST TONIGHT.

ON THE 5TH DAY LACK OF SHELLING EXCEPT FOR SPORADIC EXPLOSIONS SUGGESTS THE WORST MAY BE OVER IN AMMAN.... BUT TO JUDGE FROM BBC WORLD SERVICE RADIO REPORTS OF EDITORIALS OUTSIDE WORLD CLEARLY HAS NOT MUCH IDEA OF WHATS BEEN HAPPENING IN AMMAN. THIS MORNING FOR EXAMPLE FINANCIAL TIMES QUOTED AS SAYING WHY KING HUSSEIN NOT USING EVERYTHING HE'S GOT TO BEAT GUERRILLAS. WELL, FACT IS FOR FOUR DAYS KINGS ARMY HAS BEEN THROWING EVERYTHING BAR THE AIR FORCE AT THEM... HEAVY MACHINEGUNS, MORTARS AND ARTILLERY. FIGHT HAS BEEN DRAGGING ON BECAUSE ARMY PATENTLY USING WRONG TACTICS. ANSWER TO INDIVIDUAL MOBILE GUERRILLAS WHO POP UP ON ROOF TOPS FOR FEW SECONDS IS NOT LONG RANGE ARTILLERY AND MORTARS. ONLY WAY TO CLEAR GUERRILLAS IS TO USE INFANTRY IN STREET TO STREET AND HOUSE TO HOUSE CORDON AND SEARCH AS BRITS DID IN ADEN FOR EXAMPLE. UNFORTUNATELY FOR HUSSEIN HIS ARMY NOT TRAINED FOR THIS AND ANYWAY WITH ALL OTHER COMMITMENTS HE DOESNT HAVE ENOUGH MEN FOR THIS.

ARMY IS CLEARLY ENJOYING THE FIGHT. SPOKESMAN ALREADY SAID EVERYTHING THAT MOVES IS FEDAYEEN. FROM MY VANTAGE POINT I GET IMPRESSION THAT ARMY BLASTS AWAY WITH MORTARS AND ARTILLERY EVERYTIME CURTAIN MOVES IN A HOUSE. TIS HORRIFYING TO WATCH WHOLE HOUSES DISAPPEAR AS ONE, TWO, THREE AND FOUR SHELLS CRASH INTO THEM. I HAVE SEEN FAMILIES FLEEING FROM SHELLED HOUSES ONLY TO BE CUT DOWN SECONDS LATER BY FIVE MINUTE RAKING FROM HEAVY MACHINE GUNS TO BE FAIR GUERRILLAS ARE ENJOYING PROVOKING ARMY WITH SINGLE SHOTS TO BRING THIS MASSIVE OVERKILL UPON CIVILIANS. NO POINT IN MY TRYING ESTIMATE CASUALTIES - SUSPECT WE SHALL NEVER KNOW THE TRUTH - BUT TIS CLEAR NUMBER OF CIVILIANS KILLED MUST BE VASTLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS KILLED.

/UNABLE FROM

P.A  
201.

UNABLE FROM HERE TO COMMENT ON SYRIAN INTERVENTION EXCEPT TO SPEC-  
ULATE THAT AIM OF IT MAY BE TO HELP GUERRILLAS CONSOLIDATE THEIR  
HOLD ON THE NORTH TO ENABLE THEM TO BARGAIN IN AMMAN.  
ALSO CERTAIN SYRIAN INTERVENTION ONLY THING THAT IS NOW PERSUADING  
GUERRILLAS TO HOLD ON HERE AGAINST SUCH INCREDIBLE ODDS.  
THIS MORNING WE'VE KNOWN THE ALL-IRING CLASS OUT OF HOTEL SINCE  
W'RE BEING SHOT AT BY BOTH SIDES. REGARDS ALAN HART..

MR. PHILLIPS

[PASSED TO B.B.C.]

F I L E S  
NEWS DEPT.  
G.I.P.D.  
N.E.D.  
EMERGENCY STAFF

END

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1231

22 SEPT 1977  
(TEL)

NET 1/4

SECRET 221945Z

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR THE SEC. OF STATE)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1231 DATED 22 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO WASHINGTON TEL AVIV ANKARA CAIRO PARIS AND MOSCOW.

JORDAN

FOLLOWING ARE THE ESSENTIALS OF THE TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH  
AMMAN AT 1630Z TODAY

(1) AMMAN

THE LIFTING OF THE CURFEW WHICH I REPORTED IN MY TELCONF THIS  
MORNING WAS OF SHORT DURATION AND THE CURFEW WAS REIMPOSED AT ABOUT  
0100Z BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS THOUGH ISOLATED OUTBURSTS OF FEDAYEEN  
FIRE TO WHICH THE JORDAN ARMY REPLIED WITH HEAVY AS WELL AS LIGHT  
WEAPONS. SOME OF IT WAS VERY NEAR THE EMBASSY AT LEAST ONE SNIPER  
WHO HAS BEEN PLAGUING US HAS BEEN ELIMINATED.

SOME MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WHO REACHED THE EMBASSY DURING THE LIFTING  
OF THE CURFEW MANAGED TO GET AWAY WITH DIFFICULTY. I WAS ALSO  
ABLE TO VISIT MY HOUSE AND RETURN AFTER GETTING A CHANGE OF CLOTHING.  
I HAVE NOT KEPT ANY EXTRA MEMBERS OF THE STAFF IN WITH ME  
BECAUSE OF THE STRAIN ON EXISTING FACILITIES.

KING HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO COMPLAIN THAT THE FEDAYEEN ARE ONLY KEEP-  
ING IT UP BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE AMERIC-  
ANS AND OURSELVES TO SUPPORT HIM BY PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS TO GO  
FOR THE SYRIANS BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL FROM MOMENT TO  
ANOTHER WHAT HIS MAJESTY REALLY WANTS. IT REMAINS TRUE THAT  
SO LONG AS THE SYRIANS ( AND ALSO IRAQI) THREATS REMAIN THE FEDAYEEN  
WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE THEIR RESISTANCE IN AMMAN.

I AM VERY GLAD TO HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF YOUR TELNO 407 TO BEIRUT  
ABOUT THE DC 6 FREIGHTER AND THE ARGOSY. I HAVE MANAGED TO ALERT  
THE PALACE ABOUT PROVIDING TRANSPORT AND AN ESCORT TO THE AIRFIELD  
AND ALSO TO WARN THE MEMBER OF MY STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING  
THE EVACUATION OF WHAT IS AFOOT.

/EVERYTHING

SECRET



EVERYTHING WILL DEPEND ON THE STATE OF SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT TOMORROW BUT IF ALL IS WELL I HOPE BEIRUT WILL GIVE US THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE NOTICE TO GET THE CONVOY GOING. I SHOULD HAVE SAID EARLIEST POSSIBLE NOTICE OF THE ETA. THERE IS AN ANNOYING COMPLICATING FACTOR IN THAT AN AIRCRAFT ABOUT WHICH FOR SOME REASON I WAS NOT INFORMED WAS DUE TO ARRIVE TODAY THIS INFORMATION REACHED JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL WITH A RESULT THAT 110 OF THEM WENT TO THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING AND ARE STUCK THERE. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE PLANE WILL COME IN TOMORROW IF THE SITUATION PERMITS BUT THAT IT CAN ONLY CARRY 50 PASSENGERS. I WILL HOWEVER DO MY BEST TO SORT THIS OUT.

(1) LONDON

THANK YOU

ABOUT EVACUATION. WE VERY MUCH HOPE THE ARRESTS FOR THE DC 6 WILL GO THROUGH WITHOUT DIFFICULTY ONE OF THE POINTS

I WAS TO HAVE MADE TOO WAS THAT THE JOURNALISTS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT JUMP THE QUEUE. THIS THEY SEEM TO HAVE DONE AND IT WILL PROBABLY BE BADLY RECD HERE. THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE DC6

TOMORROW. HAVE YOU GOT A REASONABLY FIRM FIGURE OF THE NUMBER OF THE COMMUNITY WHOM YOU CAN GET TO THE AIRPORT TO FLY OUT ON THE DC6. ITS CAPACITY IS SAID TO BE 80 RPT 80.

WE SHALL NEED A SITREP OF THE STATE OF THE AIRPORT AT FIRST LIGHT TOMORROW FOR BEIRUT NICOSIA AND HQ BFNE. OK SO FAR ???

(2) AMMAN

I AM AFRAID I HAVE NO MEANS OF CONTROLLING THE JOURNALISTS I CANNOT EVEN TELEPHONE THE HOTEL NOR MY OWN STAFF THOUGH SOME EXTRANEOUS PERSONS SUCH AS THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR CAN TELEPHONE ME AS A RESULT OF A PARTIAL RESTORATION OF THE LINE.

WE CAN TAKE UP ALL OF THE FIGURE OF 80 LEAVING SOME WAITING TO GO IF WE CAN MAKE CONTACT WITH THOSE CONFINED IN SPITE OF THE REMOVAL OF THE CURFEW. THESE FIGURES AND THE NEED FOR A SITREP ARE BOTH IN YR TEL NO 407 TO BEIRUT.

/WE SHALL

SECRET

-3-

WE SHALL DO OUR BEST. I WONDER IF GIVEN REASONABLE CONDITIONS AT THE AIRPORT THE DC 6 COULD NOT MAKE ANOTHER TRIP EITHER TOMORROW OR ON 24TH.??

I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO KEEP THE AQABA IDEA ALIVE UNTIL WE KNOW HOW WE STAND.

WE HAVE HAD A RATHER QUIET DAY THAN WE EXPECTED AFTER YESTERDAYS BUT CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE ASSAULT ON SNIPERS AND POCKETS OF RESISTANCE TODAY WHICH WAS PRETTY TERRIFIC WILL GIVE US A CALMER DAY TOMORROW. AS I HAVE SAID I HAVE MANAGED TO CONVEY THE GIST OF FCO TEL. NO 407 TO ZAID RIFAI AND TO MY COORDINATOR OF EVACUATION.

(2) LONDON

MANY TKS I APPRECIATE VERY WELL THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE OPERATING AND THE IMMENSE DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO COORDINATE AN ORDERLY EVACUATION.

WE SHALL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE QUITE A LOT TO YOUR DISCRETION AND GENIUS FOR IMPROVISATION IN GETTING OUR PEOPLE AWAY. WE DO NOT OF COURSE WANT YOU TO TAKE UNACCEPTABLE RISKS BUT IF THE SITUATION IS NO WORSE TOMORROW THAN IT HAS BEEN TODAY I EXPECT YOU WILL CONSIDER CONDITIONS SATISFACTORY TO ATTEMPT AN EVACUATION OF UP TO 80% OF THE COMMUNITY BY THE DC 6. WE HAD CONSIDERED ASKING THE DC6 TO MAKE TWO TRIPS DURING THE DAY BUT BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTIES AND ADVICE FROM BEIRUT ABOUT PROBABLE DELAYS THERE WE BELIEVE IT BEST TO PLAN FOR ONE DC 6 FLIGHT TOMORROW AMMAN BEIRUT NICOSIA WHERE EVACUEES WILL BE ACCOMMODATED OVERNIGHT BEFORE BEING FLOWN TO THE U.K.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE ARE ARRANGING WITH THE ICRC FOR EVACUATION OF THE REMAINDER OF OUR PEOPLE AND OF THOSE OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS WHO WISH TO LEAVE - PROBABLY ON THURSDAY - WITH MEA CHARTERED AIRCRAFT IN ICRC COLOURS. OUR NATIONAL BID FOR TWO HUNDRED FOR THIS EVACUATION MAY BE TOO FEW IF WE SUCCEED IN GETTING 80 AWAY TOMORROW AND IF MOST OF THE BRITISH JOURNALISTS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SKIPPING. CAN YOU LET ME KNOW WHETHER YOU ARE IN CONTACT WITH YOUR FOREIGN COLLEAGUES PARTICULARLY YOUR FRENCH AMERICAN AND GERMAN AND UN COLLEAGUES OVER ARRGTs FOR EVACUATION? ANSWERS PLEASE



3. AMMAN

IT IS A TEL TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN AMMAN (11) AND FRENCH (12) BUT WE HAVE NOT MANAGED TO CONTACT THE RED CROSS AND HAVE ONLY JUST ESTABLISHED A RATHER DICEY TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION WITH THE AMERICANS WHOSE EMBASSY HAS BEEN IN THE THICK OF THE BATTLE ON JEBEL LEVERDI. MY THIRD SECRETARY IS TRYING NOW TO GET A LINE TO U.S. EMBASSY TO ASK HOW MANY THEY WOULD WISH TO EVACUATE IF TRANSPORT WERE AVAILABLE ON THURSDAY. YOU WILL RECALL THAT A RECENT TELEGRAM FROM WASHINGTON SUGGESTED THAT MY U.S. COLLEAGUE HITHERTO AND POSSIBLY EVEN NOW IN COMMUNICATION DID NOT THINK THE TIME HAD ARRIVED TO EVACUATE. I DISAGREE AND AS I HAVE SAID WE ARE TRYING TO GET AN ANSWER AT THIS MOMENT. I WILL MEANWHILE LET U IN AGAIN.

LONDON:

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE ARE ALSO KEEPING THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AQABA GOING IN CASE THE AMMAN EVACUATION PLAN FALLS THROUGH.

HAVE YOU GOT ANY OTHER POINTS ON EVACUATION WHICH US TO ANSWER NOW? YOU WILL HAVE TO PLAY YOUR HAND TOMORROW ON THE DCG WITH BEIRUT SINCE WE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTROL OF AIRPORTS WHEN THE AIRCRAFT HAS SET OFF.

4. AMMAN

DELIGHTED TO HEAR ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AQABA. WE MAY STILL NEED IT IF THE SYRIANS AND/OR IRAQIS ADVANCE. MINISTERIAL INSTRUCTION IS NOTED. I WILL DO MY BEST ON THE R/T TONIGHT WITH THE PALACE. I AM CERTAINLY PREFERRED TO LET THOSE MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WHO TAKE A PARTICULARLY TOUGH POUNDING HAVE A BREAK DECIDED LESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE DUE FOR LEAVE. I HAVE WORKED OUT A HARD CORE ST

FF WHICH THINK I SHALL HAVE TO RETAIN WITH ME SHORT OF UTTER DISASTER AND COULD LET YOU KNOW WHO THEY ARE BUT THIS MAY NOT BE THE TIME. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO CONTROL THE JOURNALISTS BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT MINISTERS THINK IT WOULD BE INQUITOUS IF THE JOURNALISTS GOT OUT OF AMMAN BEFORE MORE DESERVING CASES OF SICK, WOUNDED, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THEY HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GO TO BEIRUT TRY AND SEE THAT THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN UNQUOTE. I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND YOUR DIFFICULTIES IN CARRYING OUT THIS MINISTERIAL INSTN. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE I SUPPOSE TO ENLIST THE HELP OF THE KING AND THE PUBLIC SECURITY AUTHORITIES SUCH AS THEY ARE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE JOURNALISTS DO NOT RUSH THE DC6 WHEN IT ARRIVES.

SECRET

.. /NEXT



TEXT ON STAFF. PERSONNEL DEPT ARE KEEN TO LET YOU HAVE TEMPORARY REPLACEMENTS TO ALLOW YOUR MORE HARD PRESSED STAFF SOME RESPITE IF THE SITUATION PERMITTED COULD YOU LET INDIVIDUALS NOT YET DUE FOR LEAVE TO HAVE A BREAK? WHAT RELIEFS WOULD BE HELPFUL? COURTS REPLACEMENT CAN TRAVEL ON 2 OCTOBER. WOULD YOU ALSO LIKE A TEMPORARY SECURITY OFFICER WHO COULD COME IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS ( IF AIR TRANSPORT ALLOWS) TO HELP OUT?

HAVE YOU OR THE KING ANY NEWS ABOUT HOSTAGES?

5. AMMAN

TO TELL ABOUT HOSTAGES EXCEPT THE TWO REPORTED TEL AVIV PRISONER, WHICH SUGGEST THAT THEY MAY NOT BE IN JORDAN. I SHOULD NOT LIKE TO PLACE SECURITY OFFICERS YET. I THINK WE CAN LIVE WITH THESE REPLACEMENTS FOR SAY ANOTHER 10 DAYS.

5. LONDON

THANK YOU

CAN YOU OFFER ANY COMMENTS ON THE MILITARY SITUATION ON SYRIAN AND IRAQI INTENTIONS? IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE SYRIANS MAY BE CONTENT FOR SOME TIME TO DIG IN ON THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS IF THERE IS TO BE A CEASE FIRE AND THEN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE KING AND THE FEDAYEEN THE SYRIANS ( AND POSSIBLY THE IRAQIS) WILL BE WELL PLACED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE KING TO MEET THE FEDAYEEN DEMANDS. SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WOULD OF COURSE AGAIN OPEN UP THE PROSPECT OF THE KING THROWING IN HIS HAND. WHAT DO YOU THINK?

6. AMMAN

I PERSONALLY THINK OUR BEST INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY SITUATION AND ON SYRIAN AND IRAQI INTENTIONS IS COMING THROUGH TEL AVIV PRESUMABLY FROM THE ISRAELI AIRFORCE. THE PALACE CONSISTENTLY TAKE A LESS OPTIMISTIC VIEW AND CONSTANTLY ASK US WHAT THE ISREALIS ARE REPORTING

DOUGLAS-MOHE

[COPIES SENT TO NO:10 DOWNING ST]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
N.E.D.  
A. & T.D.  
EMERGENCY STAFF  
MOD INTERNAL

COPIES TO:  
SIR R.HOOVER CABINET OFFICE

PRIER CAT 'A'

SECRET

FLASH TEL AVIV

TO MOD UK DI 4

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 231030Z

23 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED FLASH MOD UK DI 4 R F I TO DA AMMAN,  
JIS NE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 231030Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY FOH 221140Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 230700Z SEPT.

NEG 1/4

ONE. IDF REPORT THAT AS PREDICTED SYRIAN ARMoured FORCES  
ADVANCED 3 KM SOUTH FROM PRESENT POSITION IN IRBID AREA  
EARLY YESTERDAY MORNING BUT WERE REPULSED WITH HEAVY LOSSES BY  
JORDAN ARMY TANK AND ARTILLERY FIRE. A FURTHER WEAK ATTEMPT  
TO ADVANCE SOUTH WAS MADE LATER IN THE DAY BY THE SYRIAN  
88 BRIGADE. THIS ALSO FAILED. THE SYRIAN 67 BRIGADE HAS  
MOVED BACK TO DERA. 67 BRIGADE IS BEING REPLACED BY  
1 FEDAYEEN INFANTRY BRIGADE FROM SYRIA. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE  
THAT ELEMENTS OF 88 BRIGADE ARE ALSO BEING WITHDRAWN.  
THE IDF SAY THAT THIS WITHDRAWAL WAS DUE TO ARAB AND SOVIET  
PRESSURE AND TO FEAR OF US AND ISRAELI INTERVENTION.

TWO. BECAUSE OF DOUBTS EXPRESSED REGARDING THEIR FIGURES  
OF RELATIVE TANK STRENGTHS THE IDF CARRIED OUT A VEHICLE  
COUNT AND NOW ADMIT THE FIGURES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED WERE  
INCORRECT. THE SYRIAN TANK STRENGTH IS REDUCED TO  
APPROX 230. BUT 60 OF THESE 230 ARE IMMOBILE LEAVING  
170 CONSIDERED AS BATTLEWORTHY INCLUDING THOSE OF 67 BRIGADE.  
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF THE 230 IS 80 - 83 LOCATED IN DERA  
WITH 67 BRIGADE: 57 IN RAMTH WITH 12

AND / OR 45 ARMoured REGIMENTS AND 93 SOUTH OF IRBID  
WITH 88 BRIGADE. SYRIAN ARTILLERY STRENGTH IS 31 MEDIUM  
GUNS AND 26 HOWITZERS.

SECRET

/THREE.

THREE. THE SAME COUNT SHOWED 70 JORDAN TANKS IN THE AREA NOT 150.

FOUR. ACCORDING TO THE IDF THE JORDAN ARMY HAS PUT UP A QUOTE VERY GOOD SHOW UNQUOTE AND HAVE SENT OFF EVERY SYRIAN ATTACK. THE JORDAN ARTILLERY FIRE HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE. THE JORDAN AIR FORCE MADE NEARLY 20 SORTIES YESTERDAY IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES. IDF CONSIDER THAT THE SYRIANS DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH STRENGTH AT THE FRONT TO MAKE A FURTHER ADVANCE AT PRESENT AND INDEED CAN DO LITTLE MORE THAN HOLD THEIR POSITION.

FIVE. THE IRAQI FORCES ARE STILL REPORTED AS MOVING BACK AND FORTH WITHOUT ANY APPARENT PURPOSE ALONG THE MAFRAQ-JARASH ROAD. THE STRENGTH IS NOW SAID TO BE A BATTALION GROUP. THE GROUP PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON THE ROAD MAFRAQ-IRBIT RETURNED TO MAFRAQ AND DID NOT PATROL YESTERDAY, HOWEVER IT WAS SEEN AGAIN THIS MORNING.

SIX. THE SITUATION IN AMMAN IS DESCRIBED AS CHAOTIC WITH INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING BY ARMY OF ISOLATED FEDAYEEN POCKETS OF RESISTANCE.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON AND DEFCOMCEN FLASH.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

ECO/AM DISTRIBUTION  
A.M.D.



CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

(32,34)

FLASH TEL AVIV  
TELEGRAM NO 886

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
22 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

EST. 10/10/70

1/1/71

NET 1/1/71

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 886  
OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO AMMAN  
WASHINGTON D.C. NEW YORK DETROIT LONDON MOSCOW PARIS.

JORDAN.

A CONSIDERABLE REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES HAS BEEN  
TAKING PLACE WITH MOVES OF AT LEAST THE EQUIVALENT OF A BRIGADE  
OF INFANTRY TOWARDS THE NORTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY. SOME TANKS  
HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTED AS MOVING NORTH TOGETHER WITH A  
HAWK MISSILE UNIT ESTIMATED AT BATTALION STRENGTH. MOVEMENT  
TOOK PLACE DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON AND THROUGH THE NIGHT  
OF 21 SEPTEMBER. TRAFFIC CONTROL BY MILITARY POLICE WAS  
EVIDENT ALONG ROUTES NORTH FROM TEL AVIV. ALTHOUGH THE  
MILITARY MOVEMENT TOOK PLACE MOSTLY AT NIGHT, THERE WAS LITTLE  
ATTEMPT AT CONCEALMENT. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS DEPLOYED NEAR  
AIRFIELDS NORTH OF TEL AVIV FOR EXAMPLE REMAIN OPENLY DISPLAYED.

2. A MEMBER OF THE EMBASSY WHOM WE SENT TO LOOK YESTERDAY  
CONFIRMED THAT THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WERE QUIET AND THERE WAS LITTLE  
MILITARY ACTIVITY. CERTAINLY IT WAS NOTHING MORE THAN USUAL.  
FROM DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICAN AND CANADIAN ATTACHES, WE  
UNDERSTAND THAT THE MAIN INFANTRY MOVEMENT WAS TO BIVOUAC  
AREAS NEAR TOWN OF BEIT SHEAN. THE DESTINATION OF THE HAWK  
BATTALION IS UNKNOWN, ALTHOUGH WE KNOW THAT THERE ARE  
PREPARED POSITIONS FOR THEM ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

3. BEIT SHEAN IS A CONVENIENT CONCENTRATION AREA FROM WHICH  
THE IDF COULD MOVE AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES IF THEY SO WISHED.  
THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THEM WOULD APPEAR TO BE

/(A)

(A) AN ATTACK FROM KUNEITRA SOUTH-EAST TOWARDS DERA'A, THUS CUTTING OFF THE SYRIAN FORCES AT PRESENT IN JORDAN SEMICOLON

(B) AN ATTACK FROM KUNEITRA SOUTH-EAST TOWARDS DERA'A, THUS CUTTING OFF THE SYRIAN FORCES AT PRESENT IN JORDAN SEMICOLON.

(C) A DIRECT ASSAULT USING HELICOPTER-BORNE TROOPS TOWARDS IRBID. THE HAWKS COULD BE USED AS COVER FOR A HELICOPTER MOVEMENT OR EVEN FOR INFANTRY CONCENTRATIONS.

4. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE CONTEMPLATING SUCH ACTION AND THE MILITARY MOVEMENT MAY ONLY REPRESENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REDEPLOYMENT THE IDF IS NOW IN A BETTER POSITION TO INTERVENE IF THE GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO DO SO.

5. FROM THE US ATTACHES WE HAVE HEARD THAT A LIAISON PARTY FROM THE SIXTH FLEET VISITED TEL AVIV YESTERDAY. THEY DISCUSSED OVERFLYING RIGHTS AND ROUTES WITH THE ISRAELIS. IT APPEARS THAT THE USE OF NAFAAQ AIRFIELD WAS ALSO DISCUSSED. THIS COULD OF COURSE BE CONNECTED SIMPLY WITH EVACUATION PLANNING. ALTERNATIVELY IT COULD INDICATE SOME JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING. BUT THERE IS NO FIRM EVIDENCE OF THIS. INDEED, THE ISRAELI MILITARY, FOR THEIR PART, ARE EXPRESSING IMPATIENCE AT AMERICAN INDECISION.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON UKHIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

CYHHR/CAT A  
FLASH TEL AVIV

SECRET

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DI4

322

TELEGRAM NO FOH 231610Z

23 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO MOD UK DI4 TELEGRAM NO. FOH 231610Z SEPT RFI FLASH  
DA AMMAN JISNE WASHINGTON.

FOH 231610Z DEPT FROM BRITNILAT.

REF MY FOH 231030Z SEPT.

NEJ 1/4

320

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 231600Z SEPT.

1. IDF REPORT JORDAN ARMY UNITS ON OUTSKIRTS OF IRBID. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF WHETHER THEY INTEND TO ENTER TOWN OR BYPASS IT. IT IS REPORTED BY THE IDF THAT IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO ENTER THE TOWN. THEY ARE ALSO REPORTED TO BE IN RATHA.

2. ALL SYRIAN ARMY TANKS ARE REPORTED OUT OF JORDAN. 187 WERE COUNTED AS THEY WITHDREW. THE SYRIAN 67 BRIGADE COVERED THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES IN JORDAN WHO ARE NOW REPORTED AS BEING BACK BEHIND THE SYRIAN BORDER. THERE WAS NO CONTACT BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWING SYRIAN FORCES AND THE JORDAN ARMY WHO APPEARED TO BE FOLLOWING UP THE WITHDRAWAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DEFCONCEN AND WASHINGTON

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MOD UK DI 4 AND JISNE.

MR. BARNES.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED [SENT TO D.C.C.]  
TO WASHINGTON]

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SECRET



(323)

CYPHER CAT A

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FLASH TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 896

23 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL (DTG 231105Z)

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 896  
OF 23 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO ~~NEW YORK~~ <sup>NEW YORK, 1/4</sup>  
WASHINGTON, UK, NEW YORK, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, JISNE,  
MOSCOW AND PARIS.

221  
NY TELEGRAM NUMBER 886: JORDAN.

THE BUILD-UP OF ISRAELI FORCES IN THE NORTH-EAST OF THE COUNTRY  
CONTINUES. WE NOW HAVE RELIABLE EVIDENCE THAT A RESERVE ARMoured  
BRIGADE AND A RESERVE MECHANISED BRIGADE HAVE BEEN MOBILISED.

IF SO, THE ISRAELIS MUST HAVE THE EQUIVALENT OF FOUR BRIGADES, OR  
PERHAPS EVEN MORE, CONCENTRATED IN THE NORTH-EAST.

2. THE BULK OF THE RECENTLY MOBILISED FORCE REMAINS IN THE DIVOUAC  
AREA NEAR THE TOWN OF BEIT SHEAN AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AS YET  
THAT THEY ARE MOVING OUT EITHER INTO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS OR FOR  
ANY OPERATION. THE TWO REGULAR BRIGADES IN THE AREA REMAIN IN THEIR  
NORMAL LOCATIONS, THOUGH IN A HIGH STATE OF ALERT.

3. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS, WHICH WE ARE CHECKING URGENTLY,  
OF FORCES BEING CONCENTRATED BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND JERICHU.

4. WE HAVE SENT A MEMBER OF THE EMBASSY TO LOOK AT THE BEIT  
SHEAN/GOLAN AREA AGAIN TODAY, AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ATTACHES  
OF FRIENDLY EMBASSIES ARE TRYING TO KEEP A WATCH ON THE SITUATION  
GENERALLY.

/5.

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5. SO FAR THE MILITARY DISPOSITIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR ANY OF THE POSSIBLE COURSES IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE OR JUST WITH A DETERRENT POSTURE.

6. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WHICH COULD OF COURSE BE COMBINED WITH ANY OF THESE COURSES OR COULD HAPPEN SEPARATELY IS AN AIR STRIKE. BUT WE SHOULD BE UNLIKELY TO SEE ANY ADVANCE INDICATIONS OF THIS.

F C O PLEASE PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON, UK HIS NEW YORK, PARIS  
DEFCONCEN.

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO JISNE.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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FATHER CAT A

FLASH TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 897

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

23 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL (D T G 231115Z)

URGENT TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 897  
23 SEPTEMBER 1970 FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON  
AMMAN, UK MIS NEW YORK, AND IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, JERSEY,  
BAGHDAD, MOSCOW AND PARIS.

323

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: JORDAN.

ISRAEL CABINET IS REPORTED TO HAVE HAD A FIVE-HOUR MEETING  
YESTERDAY TO CONSIDER THE CURRENT SITUATION AFTER KING HUSSEIN'S  
RETURN. NO SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENT WAS ISSUED, BUT THE PRESS HAS  
ASSUMED THAT DISCUSSION CENTRED ON THE JORDAN CRISIS AND ITS  
IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL.

2. A USUALLY RELIABLE JOURNALIST SOURCE CLOSE TO THE PRIME  
MINISTER HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT NO DECISION WAS TAKEN OTHER THAN  
TO KEEP OPTIONS OPEN. THESE WERE PROBABLY THOSE SUMMARIZED IN  
PARAGRAPH 1 OF MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 897. THE SOURCE ADDED THAT  
GENERAL DAYAN HAD BEEN AMONG THOSE RELUCTANT TO INTERVENE IN  
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE GROUND THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY WAS  
NOT THREATENED AND THAT THERE WAS NO REASON WHY SHE SHOULD  
RISK INCURRING INTERNATIONAL OPINION BY INTERVENING ON KING HUSSEIN'S  
BEHALF. IF THE AMERICANS THOUGHT INTERVENTION DESIRABLE, THEY  
SHOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO ACT THEMSELVES.

3. THIS LINE IS GENERALLY REFLECTED IN TODAY'S PRESS.

4. THE DECISION TO MOBILISE AN ARMoured BRIGADE MUST HAVE BEEN  
TAKEN BEFORE YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING. IT CAN BE EXPLAINED  
AT LEAST IN PART BY THE NEED TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN AND WOULD  
PROBABLY BE NECESSARY FOR EITHER OPTION (C) OR (D) IN PARAGRAPH  
1 OF MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 897. IN PARTICULAR, IF IT IS CONFIRMED  
THAT TROOPS ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE JERICHO AS WELL AS THE  
WEST BANK AREA, THIS WOULD FACILITATE A MOVE TO SQUEEZE OUT

THE HIGH GROUND TO THE EAST OF THE JORDAN (THE GILEAD)

IF THE ISRAELIS SAW A RISK OF HOSTILE FORCES DOMINATING IT.

1/5. THE



- 2 -

5. THE INDICATIONS THEREFORE ARE THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN AND THAT THE BALANCE OF OPINION IN THE CABINET IS STILL AGAINST UNSUPPORTED INTERVENTION BY ISRAEL. THIS IS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE U.S. EMBASSY. THIS MAY OF COURSE BE A SMOKESCREEN TO COVER SOME MORE POSITIVE PLANNING, AND IT IS CLEAR, E.G. FROM THE CLOSE INTEREST WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE TAKING IN THE REPLACEMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES BY FEDAYEEN AND THE KING'S LIKELY REACTIONS, THAT THEY ARE STILL WATCHING THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND KEEPING ALL THEIR OPTIONS OPEN. BUT THERE IS NO SIGN OF ANY PREPARATION OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR AN ISRAELI INTERVENTION.

FCO PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON LHMIS NEW YORK AND IMMEDIATE TO PARIS AND DEFCONCEN.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JISNE.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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22-2

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OTHER CAT/A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

FLASH AMMAN TEL NO.15 TO TEL AVIV

23 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL. 231000Z.

AS REPORTED TO TEL AVIV FLASH TELEGRAM NO 15 DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1970  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO FCO.

KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE INTERESTED FOR ANY CONFIRMATION OR DETAIL  
WHICH YOU CAN OBTAIN FROM I.R.A. SOURCES OF REPORT THAT SYRIANS  
ARE WITHDRAWING FROM SOME AREAS NEAR IRBID AND RAMTHA.

NET 1/4

MR PHILLIPS

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PHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2123

TO WASHINGTON

22 SEPT 1970

(EMERGENCY STAFF)

NES 1/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

222315Z

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 2123 DATED 22 SEPT REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV

TELEX CONVERSATION WITH AMMAN AT 1830Z

WE HAVE PASSED THE QUOTE CITREP OF FIGHTING UNQUOTE TO THE AMERICAN  
EMBASSY HERE INFORMING THEM THAT THE KING HAS REQUESTED THAT THIS  
INFORMATION SHOULD ALSO BE PASSED TO THE ISREALIS. WE HAVE NOT  
DONE THIS OURSELVES.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EMERGENCY STAFF

NR. EASTERN DEPT.

AMERICAN DEPT.

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CYPRER/CAT A

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO. 368

22 SEP 1970. (HED)

NET 1/4.

CONFIDENTIAL. 221100Z

POOL PRESS MESSAGES.

YOUR TELEGRAMS CONTAINING POOL PRESS MESSAGES HAVE CAUSED US A  
LITTLE DIFFICULTY WITH NEWSPAPERS IN LONDON, PARTICULARLY THOSE  
DESPATCHES PASSED FOR AMERICAN AGENCIES AND NEWSPAPERS ONLY.  
DIPLOMATIC SERVICE PROCEDURE (VOLUME 8, CHAPTER 21, PARAGRAPH 7)  
LAYS DOWN THAT IF MORE THAN ONE BRITISH CORRESPONDENT IS PRESENT IT  
ONLY A POOL DESPATCH CAN BE SENT, AND ITS COST RECOVERED. AS FAR AS  
POSSIBLE PLEASE ADHERE TO THIS AND PASS ONLY ONE MESSAGE PER DAY ON BEHALF  
OF ALL CORRESPONDENTS. WE HOPE THIS WILL HELP YOUR COMMUNICATIONS  
LOAD, AS WELL AS OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS AT THIS END.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.S.D.  
A.S.S.A.P.  
NEWS D.  
COMINT.D.

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NET 1/4

328

IPHER/CAT A

SECRET

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 429

TO TEL AVIV  
23 SEPTEMBER 1973.  
(EH.STAFF)

SECRET. 231810Z

AMENDED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 OF 23 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO AMMAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.895.

YOU MAY TELL THE ISRAELIS THAT KING HAFEZ HAS TOLD H.M. AMBASSADOR  
THAT HIS INTENTION IS TO "CLEAR THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH IF HE  
CAN, BUT NOT PURSUE THE SYRIANS INTO SYRIA".

2. (FOR AMMAN ONLY). WE DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED  
IN PASSING THE FURTHER QUESTION TO THE ISRAELIS MENTIONED BY YOU  
AT THE END OF OUR TELEX CONFERENCE.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

FILES:  
N.E.D.  
EH.STAFF

SECRET

07 11 2000 1

SECRET

323

FLASH TEL AVIVH

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DI4

TELEGRAM NO FOH 240950Z

24 SEPTEMBER 1970

ADDRESSED TO FLASH NOB UK DI 4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 240950Z SEPT  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO DA AMMAN JIS NE AND WASHINGTON.

FOH 240950Z SEPT FROM BRITHILAT.

REF ILY FOH 231610Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 240700Z SEPT.

NEJ 1/4

ONE. IDF REPORT SITUATION IN NORTH IS THAT JORDAN ARMY REMAINS ON OUTSKIRTS OF IRBID. THERE IS SOME MORTAR FIRE FROM CENTRE OF TOWN ON TO ARMY POSITIONS BUT IDF SAY THERE IS NO TRUTH IN REPORT OF HEAVY SHELLING OF THE TOWN OR OF QUOTE INDISCRIMINATE SLAUGHTER UNQUOTE. IDF OPINION IS THAT ARMY ARE GIVING FEDAYEEN A CHANCE TO LEAVE TOWN. OTHERWISE THEY WILL GO IN AND CLEAR IT. THE FORCE INVOLVED IS THE 1 FEDAYEEN INFANTRY BRIGADE OF THE PLA AND REPORTEDLY HAS NO ARMOUR AS ALL SYRIAN TANKS WERE WITHDRAWN YESTERDAY. RAMTA IS IN JORDANIAN HANDS AND ARMY IS PATROLLING UP TO SYRIAN BORDER.

TWO. IDF REVIEW OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS THAT THERE WAS LITTLE OR NO CONTACT BETWEEN THE SYRIANS AND JORDAN ARMY DESPITE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY. THEY ONLY SAW FOUR SORTIES BY THE JORDAN AIR FORCE DURING YESTERDAY'S WITHDRAWAL. IN EARLIER BATTLE ON 22 SEPT IDF SAY JORDAN ARMY STARTED WITH ONLY 36 TANKS SUBSEQUENTLY INCREASED TO 90 DURING COURSE OF DAY. THE COMMANDER OF NO 2 DIVISION, WHO WAS WOUNDED ON 10 SEPT, DIRECTED OPERATIONS FROM HIS STRETCHER. TANK LOSSES ARE CLAIMED AS 103 SYRIAN TO 19 JORDANIAN. THE IDF ARE VERY IMPRESSED WITH FIGHTING QUALITY AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF JORDAN ARMY AND EXPRESS UNQUALIFIED PRAISE FOR THEIR CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST SYRIANS. THE IDF ARE NOT SO IMPRESSED WITH THE ARMY'S OPERATIONS IN AMMAN AND BLAME ARMY FOR USING MASSIVE FIRE-POWER AND NOT FOLLOWING UP TANKS WITH INFANTRY IN CLEARING THE TOWN.

SECRET

/THREE.



THREE. THE IDF VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN AMMAN AND IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY IS THAT YESTERDAY THERE WAS SERIOUS FIGHTING IN AMMAN WITH THE ARMY USING INFANTRY. DURING THE NIGHT FIRING CONTINUED. INCIDENTS INVOLVING CLASHES WITH FEDAYEEN ARE ALSO REPORTED IN JARASH: AJLOUN: KARAH AND ZERKA. IN ZERKA THE FEDAYEEN TOOK OVER AN ARMY ENGINEER CAMP FOR A SHORT TIME. IN THE SOUTH THE BEDU TRIBESMEN AND SAUDI FORCES HAVE COOPERATED IN DEALING WITH LOCAL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. THE ARMY ARE SAID TO HAVE HAD TO QUOTE RESTRAIN THE BEDU FROM COMMITTING ATROCITIES ON THE FEDAYEEN UNQUOTE. CASUALTY FIGURES, PARTICULARLY IN AMMAN, ARE REPORTED TO BE EXAGGERATED BY THE FEDAYEEN BUT UNDER ESTIMATED BY THE ARMY. THE IDF BELIEVE THE TRUTH LIES SOMEWHERE ABOUT HALFWAY BETWEEN.

FOUR. THE IDF SAY THEY BELIEVE SOME LIBYANS HAVE ARRIVED IN SYRIA TO JOIN THE FEDAYEEN. THEY ACCEPT THAT SOME IRAQIS MAY ALSO HAVE JOINED. DESPITE PRESENT IRAQI NON-INTERVENTION THE IDF REMAIN APPREHENSIVE OVER IRAQI INTENTIONS AND SA ID THEY ARE QUOTE WATCHING THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN VERY CLOSELY UNQUOTE.

FIVE. THERE IS STILL NO NEWS OF THE 54 HOSTAGES. THE IDF SAY THEY BELIEVE THE WANDAT CAMP HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY SEARCHED BUT WITH NO SUCCESS. THEY STILL BELIEVE THE BULK OF THE HOSTAGES ARE HELD IN AMMAN QUOTE PROBABLY IN DEEP CELLARS UNQUOTE WITH THE GROUP ALLEGED TO BE IN ZERKA HELD BY ONE OF THE FEDAYEEN GROUPS STILL IN THAT TOWN.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DFECOMCEN AND WASHINGTON.

DFECOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MOD UK DIA AND JIS ME.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[SENT TO D:C.C.]

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- 2 -

WE APPRECIATE ABOVE ALL YOUR HELP AND SUPPORT DURING THE VERY CRUCIAL ANXIOUS MOMENTS WHEN THE ODDS APPEARED TOO GREAT AND TOO NUMEROUS AGAINST US. WE FELT IN OUR STRUGGLE OF LIFE AND DEATH THAT WE WERE NOT ALONE. WE CONTINUE TO NEED HELP AND SUPPORT TO REBUILD AND FACE THE MULTITUDE OF HUMAN DEMANDS AND REQUIREMENTS, AND TO REPLENISH OUR LOSSES ON THE MILITARY LEVEL. BELIEVE ME, SIR, I HAVE A STRONG CONVICTION THAT THIS COUNTRY, ITS PEOPLE AND ITS ARMED FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO BE A VERY HARD NUT TO CRACK. THIS MAY HAVE BEGUN TO DAWN ON MANY AROUND US AND IN THE WORLD.

GOD BLESS YOU. WITH ALL MY RESPECTS AND VERY BEST WISHES AND REGARDS.

ENDS

MR. PHILLIPS

/REPEATED TO WASHINGTON/

F I L E S

N.E.D.  
EMERGENCY STAFF  
AMERICAN-D.  
COMMS. D.  
P.S. TO C.D.L.  
P.S. TO MR. GODBER  
P.S. TO MR. ROYLE  
P.S. TO LORD LOTHIAN  
SIR P. ADAMS

CONFIDENTIAL

0.20100

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~~Handwritten text~~

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TELIFU

W



(S.P.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYRUS CAT A

FLASH ALEEN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 645

24 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL. 241100Z.

NEJ 1/4

ADDRESSED FCO TELEGRAM NO 645 DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON.

FROM AMBASSADOR.

MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE MANAGED TO EMERGE FROM HIS EMBASSY THIS  
MORNING IN A TANK. HE IS AT THE MOMENT WITH ME MUCH  
APPRECIATING A CAN OF BEER AFTER A WEEK OF WATER. AND WOULD  
LIKE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT OVER OUR CHANNEL.

BEGINS:-

PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON.  
WAS ABLE TO GET OUT TO SEE KING FOR SEVERAL HOURS THIS  
MORNING TRAVELLING IN AN M-113 WITH ESCORT OF ARMoured  
CARS, ALL GUNS FIRING. UNABLE TO RETURN TO EMBASSY TODAY.  
HAVE ASKED BRITISH EMBASSY TO PASS THIS CABLE AND THE  
FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM KING TO PRESIDENT.

BEGINS:-

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM KING HUSSEIN.

SIR,

MAY I EXPRESS MY DEEPEST APPRECIATION FOR YOUR FRIENDSHIP  
SYMPATHY AND GENUINE CONCERN OVER THE PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES  
WHICH MY COUNTRY FACES. OUR ONLY CONSOLATION LIES IN ANY  
DETERMINATION TO MAKE OF THESE TRAGIC EVENTS A TURNING POINT  
THAT WILL ENABLE US TO REBUILD JORDAN ON A DYNAMIC, SOLID BASIS.  
WE ARE AND HAVE BEEN FULLY AWARE OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES NOT  
ONLY TO DEFEND WITH OUR LIVES OUR SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL  
INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE, BUT ALSO OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN  
THE AREA, AND TOWARDS ITS FUTURE AS WELL AS THE CAUSE OF JUSTICE  
AND PEACE, HERE AND IN THE WORLD. /WE

CONFIDENTIAL

Emergency Unit

15 SEP 1970

Sir Philip Adams

RECEIVED  
CONTROL POINT

Sir Philip Rogers telephoned this morning to say that a member of his Department had been at school in Palestine with one of the guerrilla leaders. He was not certain of the name, but thought it was Hawatneh or Habash, probably the former. He wondered whether he could conceivably be of any assistance to us. I thanked Sir Philip Rogers and said that we would get in direct touch.

The person concerned is Mr. S. Taylor, Senior Legal Assistant in the Department of Health and Social Security - Tel. number 242.9020 ext. 619. You may wish to ask someone to get in touch with Mr. Taylor.

(T. L. A. Daunt)  
15 September, 1970

Copies to: Emergency Unit  
NED  
A&TD

Notes A. D. Dawson filed

Walid Haddad

Times 12/9

43 now


read medicine book

St. Luke's School, Haifa

Nº 2 PFLP.

2 triplet, George & Rachel


Father is Arabic teacher  
still alive in Amman



Sir Philip Adams

Sir Philip Rogers telephoned this morning to say that a member of his Department had been at school in Palestine with one of the guerrilla leaders. He was not certain of the name, but thought it was Hawat<sup>m</sup>deh or Habash, probably the former. He wondered whether he could conceivably be of any assistance to us. I thanked Sir Philip Rogers and said that we would get in direct touch.

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(T. L. A. Daunt)  
15 September, 1970

Copies to: Emergency Unit  
NED  
A&TD

Mr. Tuff. Mr. Hayes. P. Lee 12/11  
Sir P. Adams will be 18/9  
Grateful if you will  
tell Austin  
J.P.S.  
15-9.



NEJ1/4

Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

332

21 September, 1970

PPF

You may have seen a useful article in "The Times" of  
12 September about the PFLP and in particular about Wadi Haddad.  
... I enclose a copy of it for case reference.

2. This article was also spotted by a Mr. Samuel Taylor, Senior  
Legal Assistant in the Department of Health and Social Security  
here in London, and he has telephoned us to say that he was at  
school with Haddad at St. Luke's School in Haifa, towards the end  
of the Palestine Mandate. He wonders if this fact can be of use  
to us in any way. He did not claim to have been a particular  
friend of Haddad and was not able to add much to "The Times"  
article beyond saying that Haddad was one of triplets, the other  
two being named George and Rashid. He also said that Haddad's  
father was, to the best of his knowledge, still alive and living  
in Amman. I pass on this for what it is worth.

(C.W. Long)

M.D. Lush, Esq.,  
Amman.

Copies to:

G.M. Woodrow, Esq.,  
Jerusalem.

M.J. Mandel, Esq.,  
Tel Aviv.

# The masters of Dawson's Field

By Our Special Correspondent

George Habbash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) has been conveniently absent in North Korea this week. His deputy in charge of the operations is Wadi Haddad, who like his chief is a Christian and a doctor.

Haddad was born 43 years ago. His family comes from north Palestine, and his father was converted from Greek Christianity to Presbyterianism. The father became head Arabic teacher at St. Luke's School in Haifa, which his son also attended. Pupils at the school were mixed—Jews and Europeans as well as Christian and Muslim Arabs. Wadi is reported to have been a rather recalcitrant student. He was a wiry young man, a good sprinter and high jumper.

From Haifa he went to the medical school at the American University of Beirut, which George Habbash also enrolled in. Whereas Habbash was one of the most brilliant students of his generation Haddad qualified only with difficulty. He was already absorbed in extreme nationalist politics and in a good deal of trouble with the authorities. He married a schoolteacher.

Haddad belonged to the elite Harraklin group, which at that time looked to President Nasser. In the years since the June war, President Nasser grew understandably worried at the extremists' cult of a Mao-Guevara leftism and switched his support to the Fatah, whose leader, Yasir Arafat, had spent most of his life in Egypt.

Haddad, like Habbash, is a single-minded fanatic. He is an ascetic character, scrupulously honest. Indeed, one of the attractions of the P.F.L.P. to young Arabs is that it offers nothing but blood, tears and sweat. It is not contaminated by the rivalries—or by the cash—of Arab governments. Its members know that they are outlaws, and like the nineteenth-century Russian anarchists derive an almost mystical satisfaction from knowing that they are a small band cut off from the world, obeying rules and standards of their own making.

It is not a coincidence that a large number of the P.F.L.P. are Christians (though Leila Haddad is a Muslim girl). From the beginnings of the Arab nationalist movement in the last century it has often been Christian Arabs who have made the pace. This is understandable

since it was they who first came into contact with European thought, either by direct contact with Europe or through mission schools.

There is another, and perhaps stronger reason for their leadership. Christians in the Middle East are a minority—not a persecuted minority but, except in Egypt and Syria, not usually a part of the Muslim establishment. Intelligent and active young Christian Arabs found in progressive politics an outlet for their abilities.

It was often Christians who provided the theoretical basis for new political parties and the energy behind them—Antun Saada's P.P.S., for example. The Baath Party, now split into so many warring and boring factions, was founded by another Christian, Michel Aflaq.

The further a party moves to the left the easier it is for it to become—at least in theory—above racial or religious distinctions. Just as Jews in east Europe often found that communism offered them a home as well as a creed that brought them release from the ghetto, so Christians in the Arab world have found a new equality in an extreme political party. It is difficult to say what proportion


of the P.F.L.P. is Christian, but among the hard core of activists (say 200-500) it might be as high as 50 per cent.

These are the people who have been sitting round Dawson's Field all the week with their machine-guns at the ready. These are the people who took over the control tower at Beirut airport when it is time for a hijacked plane to refuel. Their activities have not made them popular with the governments of Jordan or Lebanon. At Dawson's Field an outer circle of Jordan army tanks surrounds the inner circle of guerrillas. The Jordan military is waiting for the order to liquidate the guerrillas, and the fact that the leaders of this infinitely troublesome group of extremists is Christian and Palestinian does nothing to endear them to troops many of whom are Muslim Beduin from east Jordan.

There is an obvious danger here that the guerrillas, calculating that they are likely to be liquidated whatever happens, may prefer to end up in a holocaust. Such a calculation would be in keeping with what is known of Haddad's character. On the other hand some of his followers may lack his unswerving zeal. They may be now negotiating with the Red Cross authorities for their own safety as well as for that of their captives.

P.O.





CONFIDENTIAL

333

NEJ

15/9

to note!

10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

September 15, 1970.

R.E.

17/9.

Am Rous

McGowan

R

17-9

Dear Ian,

18/9  
Mr. Long Enie

Thank you for your letter of September 14 to Christopher Roberts about the Jordanian proposal earlier this month for a four power statement condemning Iraqi intervention in Jordan.

Since this matter arose so much has happened and the situation has so changed that I do not at this time propose to put the papers to the Prime Minister. I am sure, however, that you will wish to keep in mind the views which have been expressed by the Prime Minister in so far as they may be relevant to the handling of any similar situation in the future.

Yours sincerely

Pelham

Mr Long

I. McCluney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



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NET 1/4

Mr. Tripp

Action taken on telex conference with Amman at 1830:-

- (a) B.B.C. announcement. Consular Department duty officer asked the B.B.C. to go ahead with this. In the light of Consulate General Geneva telegram No. 55, Mr. Egerton and I agreed that these broadcasts should be suppressed. The B.B.C were so informed.
- (b) Amman's request that Beirut should ensure that the plan is available at Amman not later than 0900Z. This has been overtaken by Beirut telegram No. 487 which states that clearance has been requested for take-off ~~from~~ Beirut at 1200Z. I agreed with Mr. Egerton on the telephone last night that we should not try to alter this latest proposal from Beirut.
- (c) I have drawn Beirut's attention to Mr. Phillips' request for beer (FCO telegram to Beirut No.     ).
- (d) King Hussein's request for protection for his family. I spoke to Inspector David Palmer Hall of Special Branch. He said he knew the King personally and would be grateful if we could pass a personal assurance that Princess Muna, her children and all other members of the Jordanian Royal Family in London were being specially protected. This should be passed to Mr. Phillips at the next telex conference.

Pa

(V. E. Beckett) (Miss)  
Emergency Unit  
23 September, 1970


c.c. - Mr. Egerton - Emergency Unit

Go Mr



Mr. Tripp

Request from the American Embassy for information  
from Amman



Mr. Oplinger, the U.S. Embassy Duty Officer, rang to say that communications between the Palace and the U.S. Embassy in Amman were bad. He would therefore be grateful to know whether we could pass him information on the situation in Jordan whenever we received this from Mr. Phillips. You agreed that it would be in order to give the Americans factual information of this sort.

2. I telephoned Mr. Oplinger and informed him of this. He asked us to tell H.M. Ambassador at Amman when we were next in touch that this procedure had been agreed.

*Verana Beckett.*

(V. E. Beckett) (Miss)  
Emergency Unit  
22 September, 1970


c.c. Mr. Egerton

Mr. Ibbott

*P.O.*

Note for file

Mr. Gervin Kser.



Mr. Oplinger of the American Embassy telephoned at 2100 BOT.

2. They have heard from one of the Newsweek correspondents that two convoys totalling 88 people have been moved from the Intercontinental Hotel to Amman Airport and are staying overnight in a bunker at the airport. They hope to fly out on a Red Cross plane tomorrow morning.

3. They have also heard from the TWA staff in Amman that the Red Cross team have moved from their headquarters and are now in the Intercontinental Hotel.

(C.D. Budgen)

22 September, 1970

RPM